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It is widely agreed that during the last decade, the supply 
side of the Italian economy, in line with other European 
countries, has undergone a process of substantial structural 
change.
Within this period of intense changes, the '70s have been 
characterized by an unprecedented increase in inflation and wage 
shares, together with a slowdown in the productivity of labour; 
the first half of the '80s, instead, has been marked by rising 
real interest rates, alarmingly high and rising unemployment and a 
recovery of the productivity of labour. Low rates of growth of the 
G.D.P. as compared to the '60s, and stagnation of investment have 
been a constant feature over the whole period.
Economists have developed several theories that aim at 
explaining the determinants of this rather gloomy scenario. We 
shall mention briefly just a few of them.
The orthodox keynesians view the source of all troubles in the 
restrictive policies that have been adopted by the economic 
authorities. The so-called "Pigouvian" theorists, instead, claim
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that the rigidity of real wages in the presence of unfavourable 
exogenous shocks, such as the rise in the price of oil, has 
undermined the profitability of firms, held down their ability to 
invest and, therefore, is to be regarded as one of the major 
causes of the slump (see e.g. M. Bruno, 1985). Another set of 
theories that is mainly concerned with the labour market, examines 
analytically the role of social and institutional factors (e.g. 
trade unions and bargaining strategies) in the determination of 
unemployment ( see for example R. Layard and S. Nickell, 1986). 
One of the most recent analyses focuses on the links between the 
U.S. economic policies and the performance of the European 
countries, and, within the framework of an open economy two- 
country model, assigns a crucial role to the supply effects of the 
real interest rate ( J.P. Pitoussi and E. Phelps, 1987).
The present study has the aim, like the literature cited above, 
to analyze the causes of some of the changes which occurred in 
the different sections of the economy during the '70s and the 
'80s.
We focus on the Italian economy and, in particular, on the 
causes of the decline in employment, the stagnation of investment 
and the increased efficiency of capital stock in the industrial 
sector as opposed to the increase in employment and the expansion 
of capital stock in the sector which is sheltered from 
international competition.
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Our aim is to take account of all the factors that were
mentioned in our concise review of the literature. We concentrate 
on the labour market, viewing firms and unions as its main
economic agents. For this purpose, we build a theoretical model of 
the behaviour of firms and unions in an open economy two-sector 
framework, and derive the relations for the determination of 
employment, investment, prices and wages. We then proceed to test 
empirically the model on quarterly data for the period 1970-1984.
1.2. Plan of the thesis
We begin in this chapter by reviewing the facts about 
employment, investment, prices and wages in the industrial sector 
and in the sector sheltered from international competition (1.3). 
We also give a brief account of the institutions and 
characteristics of the Italian labour market (1.4).
Chapter 2 lays the microeconomic foundations of the behaviour
of the firm in our two-sector model. It starts with the static
production relations (2.1), and then introduces dynamics assuming 
adjustment costs in the inputs of labour and capital (2.2—2.3). 
The employment, investment and price relations are therefore 
derived.
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Chapter 3 reviews the theories of the determination of wages 
(3.1-3.4) and presents the specification of wage formation for our 
model (3.5).
Chapter 4 presents the econometric specification of the 
theoretical model. We discuss first of all our specification 
strategy (4.1) and then give the list of variables and the 
specification of the equations (4.2). Finally the econometric 
results are reported and commented (4.3-4.6).
Our conclusions are given in chapter 5. The Appendix with data 
and statistical sources then follows.
1.3. A description of employment, investment, wages and prices in 
two sectors of the Italian economy: 1970-1984.
The aim of our analysis, as we have mentioned in the previous 
section, is to throw some light on the causes of structural change 
in employment and in the accumulation process which occurred in 
the Italian economy in the 70's and 80's. For this purpose, we 
have built a model of the determination of employment, investment, 
wages and prices for two sectors of the economy. The choice of the 
two sectors, that is the sector which is exposed to international 
competition and the sector which is sheltered from it, was based 
on the following observations.
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The phenomenon of structural change» by its very nature» is 
usually described by the statistical evidence on the changing 
characteristics of the sectors forming the supply side of the 
economy. If we look at the sectoral composition of value added, 
for example (see table 1), we note that the share of value added 
of the industrial sector from the 70's to the 80's does not 
recover its peak level of 1974 and shows a substantial decrease in 
the 80's. The market services share of value added, instead, is 
characterized by a steady growth, and in '83-'84, for the first 
time, it overtakes the share of the industrial sector.
S e cto ra l composition o f  value added
Y e a r s A g r ic o ltu re In d u stry
M a rk e t
s e rv ic e s .
Non—m arket 
s e rv ic e s
1970 8.09 42J57 38.21 11.13
1971 7.99 41.77 38.88 11,36
1972 7.17 42.01 39.39 11,43
1973 7.18 42438 38.87 11.07
1974 7.02 43.04 3837 10.97
1975 7.50' 40.52 40.31 11.67
1976 6.81 4250 39.51 11.41
1977 6.64 41.35 40.04 11.37
1978 6.70 41.73 40.44 11.13
1979 6.77 42.07 40.47 10.68
1980 6.77 42̂ 1 40.50 10.42
1981 6.74 41.90 , 40,83 10.53
198? 6.61 41.31 41.42 10.66
1983 6j95 40.33 41.88 10^4
1984 6.70 40.43 47 73 10.64
TABLE 1
Source: ISTAT, Annuario s ta t is t ic o  1985
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The purpose of this rough comparison is simply to give an 
indication of the sections of the economy which are more relevant 
to our analysis. All the aspects of the increasing weight of the 
service sector, on the other hand, are well documented by all 
statistical sources and official reports on the Italian economy 
111.
The main focus of the economic analysis of the 70's was 
concentrated on the leading role of the industrial sector. In the 
80's, however, it has become indispensable to reconsider the role 
of services, in particular after the decline in industrial 
employment and the consolidation of the positive function they 
have exerted in containing- the already dramatic rise ,in the 
unemployment rate. The performance of this sector can no more be 
regarded as "residual", once the economic relations underlying the 
industrial production have been understood. The expansion of the 
service sector, instead, is to be considered a phenomenon which is 
deeply related to the process of structural change.
The literature on the "deindustrialization process" and on its 
links with the growth of the service sector is an example of this 
new stream of analysis [2].
In line with that literature, which is also concerned with the 
increasing difficulty of the economic system to ensure a net flow 
of exports of manufactured goods that can keep the balance of 
trade in a position of long-term equilibrium, we take account of
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international competition as one of the determinants of this 
proceâs of structural adjustment.
For the above reasons, the choice to build our model for the
sector which is exposed to international competition and the
sector which is sheltered from it, seemed the most appropriate for 
the aims of our analysis.
The exposed sector, which we call sector 1, is represented by
aggregate data for the energy and manufacturing industry. The
sheltered sector, which we call sector 2, is represented by
aggregate data for market services and the building industry. The
public sector • and agriculture are, therefore, excluded from our 
analysis. In particular, we have excluded agriculture from the 
exposed sector, given that its performance is strongly influenced 
by E.E.C. regulations. The inclusion of the building industry, for 
its relatively low weight in terms of the main economic variables, 
does not alter considerably the trend imposed on sector 2 by 
services [3]. We have included it, anyway, in order to be 
consistent with the definition of sheltered sector.
The objective of the model we present in the next chapters is
to explain the behaviour of employment, investment, wages and
prices in these two sectors. We proceed now to describe the 
performance of these variables in the period 1970—1984.
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Employment
The employment structure in the period considered has undergone 
enormous changes in all industrial countries.
"In almost all countries, moreover, increases in 
employment after 1973, even in absolute terms, are 
concentrated in the service sector. In 1980 the 
ratio of people employed in services to those in 
industry was well above unity in all industrial 
countries, ranging from 2.15 in the United States, 
to 1.35 in Italy and 1.10 in Germany". (Momigliano 
and Siniscalco, 1982, p.270)
These changes appear with evidence in the graphs of the 
employment series of the Italian exposed and' sheltered 
sector as we have defined them (fig.l). The turning point, is at 
the beginning of 1978, when the number of employed people in the 
sheltered sector becomes larger than that of employed workers in 
the industrial sector.
The year 1980 marks the beginning of the dramatic decline in 
industrial employment, a decline which has all the characteristics 
of a structural change [4].
Employment in the sheltered sector (excluding the public 
sector) continues its steady growth, though never compensating the 
decrease in industrial employment (see table 2). As far as the 
links between the structural change in employment in industry and 
services are concerned, there is evidence that the process of 
industrial restructuration imposed by the events of the last
9
EMPLOYMENT
SOURCE: 3ANK OF ITALY
SECTOR 1 PLOTTED WITH ♦ ( THE SERIES IS NET OF C. I.C. WORKERS) 












1971:1 1. 88939 -1. 13713
1971:2 0. 85452 -0. 84512
1971: 3 -0. 25583 -1. 42191
1971:4 -1.21275 -1. 10323
1972: 1 -1. 37462 0. 5B392
1972:2 -0. 40966 -0. 57456
1972:3 0. 06494 -O. 03686
1972:4 0. 50299 0. 46205
1973:1 0. 75121 -1. 36585
1973:2 1. 64621 0. 29227
1973:3 3. 09522 1. 59608
1973:4 3. 90914- 1. 89791
1974:1 4. 47260 2. 60908
1974:2 2. 92319 1. 48885
1974:3 0. 66952 1. 36614
1974:4 -0. 18203 1. 80734
1975:1 -2. 44909 1. 38985
1975:2 -2 ,99733 1. 14541
1975: 3 -2. 34874 0. 87448
1975:4 -2. 46967 -0. 45225
1976:1 -1. 06496 0. 48455
1976:2 1. 43827 1. 75077
1976:3 3. 20420 0. 46978
1976:4 3. 70024 0. 71306
1977:1 3. 40694 1. 27597
1977:2 1.28238 0. 96104
1977:3 -1.71686 1. 22320
1977.: 4 -3. 03550 1. 49517
i9 7 B :1 -2. 50741 1. 20139
197B:2 -2. 43909 ' 1. 47935
1978:3 -1. 08069 2. 24578
1978:4 -0. 11878 2. 81825
1979:1 -0.58641 3. 41504
1979:2 0. 89884 3. 04407
1979:3 1. 25883 3. 39008
1979:4 2. 28439 2. 71727
1980:1 2. 07354 1. 15144
1980:2 0. 97793 1. 84235
1980:3 -0. 47418 2. 15763
1980:4 -3.05346 2. 67102
1981:1 -4. 04501 3. 06878
1981:2 -5. 45414 2. 29767
1931:3 -5. 48624 2. 44888
1981:4 -4. 77577 1. 56256
1982:1 -2. 98111 2. 20251
1982:2 -2. 77713 1. 87798
1982:3 -3. 30899 0. 72988
1982:4 -3. 74952 1. 66937
1983: 1 -5. 24472 0. 93631
1983:2 -5. 70727 0. 69311
1983:3 -4. 25472 0. 63024
1983:4 -4. 14165 0. 66721
1984:1 -4. 59060 1. 27865
1984:2 -4. 25605 2. 08394
1984:3 -5. 97095 2. 79501
1984:4 -4. 81552 2. 55509
TABLE 2 : YEARLY RATES OF CHANCE /IN E M P L O Y ­
MENT IN SECTOR 1 CQEM1) AND 2 (Q0CD2)
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decade, has involved the transferring of some functions, which 
were typical of industrial firms, to the sector of market 
services. The Bank of Italy reports that the increase in 
employment in the sector of services to firms has been on average 
larger than 4% per year from 1980 to 1983 and larger than 15% from 
1984 to 1985.
Investment
The aggregate investment series in the period considered shows 
neither a pronounced trend nor extreme cyclical fluctuations (see 
fig.2).
Index o f  to t a l fix e d  in vestm en t.
Source: ISTAT
12
If we look at the disaggregate series for industry and the 
sheltered sector (see fig.3) we note the following:
1) the former exhibits a flat trend with accentuated upswings 
('73-'74, * 79-* 80) and downswings ('71, '75', ,82-,83);
2) the latter exhibits a moderately increasing trend and 
fluctuations which occur approximately in correspondence to those 
of investment in industry, but are less pronounced.
According to the results of several studies ( see e.g. Barca 
and Magnani, 1985) the Italian industrial sector seems to be 
undergoing a process of substantial technological innovation, 
which started in 1978-79. This conclusion follows from the 
observed significant reduction of the average life of capital and 
its increased efficiency in terms of capital per unit of output. 
The need to start the process of substitution of the already 
obsolete existing capital stock, was starting to be felt during 
the first half of the 70's as the Bank of Italy reports (see the 
Bank of Italy report for the year 1975, p.89), but a series of 
adverse circumstances which undermined the profitability rate of 
firms and their competitive ability (e.g. the increase in the cost 
of labour and the first oil shock) contributed to delay it. The 
turning point, according to Barca and Magnani, was the year 1978, 
when firms seemed to have recovered some profitability margins
that allowed them to finance investment with their resources. The
second oil shock did not evidently stop this tendency, because the
process of energy saving and the increase in imports of
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intermediate productive inputs as compared to imports of raw 
materials had already taken place after the first oil shock (see 
Heimler and Milana, 1984). Essentially, the flat trend of the 
industrial investment series might be explained with the 
observation that the recent investment behaviour has been more 
oriented towards substitution of the existing capital and less 
towards its expansion.
As far as investment in the sheltered sector is concerned, 
fig.3 shows that it was not affected so dramatically by the 
recession of 1974-1975 as it was in the exposed sector. From 1975 
onwards, investment in this sector is always higher in absolute 
value than in the industrial sector, and it is characterized by an 
increasing trend.
This tendency is mainly due to the behaviour of investment in 
the market services sector. Investment in the building industry, 
though following the pattern of aggregate investment in industry, 
is a relatively small share of total investment in the sheltered 
sector ( 4% in 1970, 2.8% in 1985).
Although we are not aware of any specific analysis about the 
characteristics of accumulation in this sector, there are some 
elements which would induce us to believe that, at variance with 
the industrial sector, they are represented substantially by 
capital-widening processes.
14
FIXEO CROSS INVESTMENT <1970 PRICES)
s o u r c e : our e l a b o r a t i o n of i s ta t d a t a
SECTOR 1 PLOTTED WITH ♦
SECTOR 2 PLOTTED WITH X
niNlNUfl 










































































It is a fact that the pillars of accumulation in the sheltered 
sector have been the compartments of Communications and Trade, two 
sectors that have relevantly expanded their capital stock .in the 
period considered [5].
The cost of labour, gross earnings and prices
The cost of labour is given by the wage bill, gross of income 
taxes, augmented by the burden of taxes on employment borne by the 
firms. Dividing by the number of employees, the cost of labour per 
employee is derived [6].
The tax rate on labour borne by employers has played a 
substantial role in the determination of the cost of labour; in 
the exposed sector in particular.
Prom the early 70's until 1976, this tax rate was around 48% of 
gross earnings of industrial employees. In the sheltered sector it 
started from 44% to reach 48% in 1976.
The introduction of the new wage indexation mechanism (see 
section 1.2.2.), in the presence of the unprecedented rise in the 
international inflation rate, led to a substantial reduction of 
the profitability margins of firms. In January 1977, some measures 
were taken by the government in order to reduce the burden of 
taxation on employers. As a result, the tax rate dropped to 39% in 
industry and 44% in the sheltered sector, reaching its minimum 
level of 34% in 1981 and 42% in 1979 in the industrial and exposed
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sector respectively. Since then, the burden of taxes has been 
increasing again, to reach 43% and 45% in 1984 respectively.
The yearly rates of change of the costs of labour p^r employee 
reflect the effects of these measures (see fig.4 and table 3).
He first of all note that, on the whole, the dynamics of the 
yearly rates of change of the labour costs per employee are more 
contained in the sheltered sector than in the exposed one.
The big expansion of the cost of labour which was started in 
1973, was in fact stopped for a while after 1977, also as a 
consequence of the reduction.of the burden of taxes on labour 
borne by firms. After the year 1980, the cost of labour had risen 
again, but its rate of. growth was smaller than in the 70*s 
(except for a sudden peak in 1981 in the industrial sector), and 
this tendency was reinforced from *82 to '84, also as a 
consequence of a trilateral agreement between firms, unions and 
the Government of containing the indexation rate of wages (January 
’83) and of predetermining the inflation rate (February *84).
As far as wages per employees are concerned, their yearly rates 
of change follow, more or less, the same pattern as for the cost 
of labour per employee except, of course, when a substantial 
change in taxes on employers takes place [7].
17
▼EARLY RATES OF CHANGE IN THE REAL COST OF LABOUR PER EMPLOYEE 
SECTOR I LOTTED WITH ♦
























































































1971:1 11.59495 17. 40418
1971:2 ' 13. 35846 15. 73033
1971:3 11. 97000 12. 74552
1971:4 11. 74282 10. 91861
1972:1 * 12.81559 9. 93742
1972:2 11. 04215 9. 98659
1972:3 8. 62303 10. 48115
1972:4 10. 57611 12. 28872
1973:1 7. 68141 17. 63904
1973:2 21. 10022 20. 32603
1973:3 29. 46920 23. 47728
1973:4 26. 70378 24. 64724
1974:1 30. 35144 22. 69253
1974:2 24.93405 23. 04684
1974:3 18. 68042 23. 99651
1974:4 21. 29658 25. 60464
1975:1 28. 15556 26. 60943
1975:2 22. 43109 27, 04716
1975:3 26. 44311 22. 84337
1975: 4 24. 01173 20. 19966
1976:1 14. 22384 16. 54214
1976:2 21. 12383 17. 74624
1976:3 23.53726 20. 34502
1976:4 26. 79274 21. 88837
1977:1 25. 60952 23. 00286'
197 7: 2 23. 70586 22. 71605
1977:3 . . 17-. 99355 20. 99394
1977: 4 14. 62622 19. 18748
1978:1 19. 94515 17. 58327
1978:2 12. 72579 14. 51583
1978: 3 13.53414 14. 93745
1978:4 14. 45459 15. 02774
1979:1 13. 65546 14. 75153
1979:2 13. 14850 16. 05766
1979:3 17. 35360 17. 62354
1979:4 19. 33775 19. 10982
1980:1 19. 35766 23. 29805
1980:2 23. 08832 24. 46128
1980:3 18. 95737 23. 37537
1980:4 17. 45239 23. 18545
1981: 1 19. 03883 19. 80023
1981:2 24. 33613 19. 15271
1981:3 25. 68712 17. 94717
1981:4 27. 42508 18. 15920
1982:1 23.13272 18. 58178
1982:2 17. 82052 17. 08725
1982:3 18. 44458 16. 99035
1982:4 17. 37628 16. 56007
1983:1 17. 16307 17. 70108
1983:2 18. 32981 17. 43484
1983:3 18.20070 *17. 26620
1983:4 16. 17080 15. 04890
1984:1 18. 85166 12. 79349
1984:2 14. 07961 11. 36509
1984: 3 10. B3302 10. 20704
1984:4 11. 50248 9. 96441
TABLE 3 : YEARLY RATES OF CHANCE IN 
COST OF LABOUR PER EMPLOYEE
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So far, we have taken into account nominal values only. To get 
a measure of the real costs of labour (the product wage) for each 
sector, we have divided the cost of labour pet employee by the 
respective value added deflator. The series are presented in 
fig.5.
The real wage (the consumption wage) is derived dividing the 
wage level by the consumption deflator. Pig.6 and 7 present the 
level of real wages, and the yearly rates of change of the value 
added and the households' consumption deflators.
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1982:3 1 • 21982:4 : ♦Y X
1983:1 J #Y X
1983:2 ! ♦ Y X
1983:3 ! 2 X
1983: 4 I Y X «1984:1 J » 21984:2 ! 2 X
1984:3 S * X Y1904.4 1 Y*X
2. 00299 
MINIMUM 3«. 3*90* MAXIMUM
FIC. 7
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1.4. Institutions and characteristics of the Italian labour 
market.
A major aim of our analysis is to build a model of the labour
market that explains the determination of employment and wages in
the two sectors of the economy we have described above. As we
shall see in chapter 2 and 3, we have represented the Italian case
with a model of the labour market where unions set wages and firms 
set employment. In this section we intend to give some evidence 
for our monopoly union assumption with a brief account of the 
institutions which characterize the Italian labour market and the 
role that unions have had in their formation.
1.4.1. Instruments to support the unemployed workers' income
Essentially, two instruments support the unemployed workers' 
income in the Italian institutional framework;
1) the unemployment benefit scheme;
2) the "Cassa Integrazione Guadagni" (C.I.G.»Income integration
fund).
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There are other instruments which are indirectly used to this 
purpose, such as, for example, some categories of disability 
pensions and family allowances..
Only workers who have been laid off are entitled to the 
unemployment benefit. The C.I.G. scheme, instead, protects the 
income of the workers who, after being declared redundant, are 
suspended from work, but still remain employed by the firm.
First job seekers, in the Italian institutional setting, are 
not entitled to any unemployment benefit, and might recur only to 
some indirect instruments of subsidization, that are only to be 
regarded as a small integration of an already existing family 
income. *
Lay-offs and unemployment benefits
As far as lay-offs are concerned, they are ruled by the 
Interconfederate Agreement of May 1965 about collective lay-offs 
and the law of July 1966 (law 604) about individual lay-offs. The 
agreement of 1965 stipulates that the firm can start a procedure 
of collective lay-offs if a reduction or a transformation of 
activity is needed. The workers' unions and the firm's 
confederations will then meet and judge the applicability of the 
proceeding. The law of 1966 stipulates that the employer can 
lay off a worker if a "valid reason" according to the Civil Law 
exists and can be proved.
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In the case of collective lay-offs, the workers are entitled to 
receive 80% of their gross wage, up to a ceiling of 750 thousand 
liras for a period of 180 days (renewable). In the case of 
individual lay-offs the unemployment benefit is just 800 liras per 
day for 180 days.
The "Cassa Integrazione Guadagni".
A firm facing serious economic difficulties can appeal to the 
C.I.G.. This institution, which is financed by public funds, 
operates 'at an ordinary and extraordinary level. Not all firms, 
however, can appeal to the C.I.G.. As a^ matter of fact, .this 
instrument is mainly used . by industrial firms of a medium and 
large size.
The ordinary C.I.G. was created in 1945 to support firms and 
workers during temporary slowdowns in economic activity. It was 
given its present set-up in 1975 (law 164). It allows firms that 
are experiencing a slack in the demand for their output to reduce 
the number of hours worked by their employees, without having to 
lay some of them off. The workers who are subject to this measure 
receive, from this public fund, 80% of their wage for the hours 
they have been idle. The firm is also relieved of the social 
contributions for the corresponding number of hours. The firm can 
appeal to the ordinary C.I.G. for a maximum of one year of work; a 
further extension involves some costs for the firm. The ordinary
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C.I.G. is, therefore, an instrument for stabilization over the 
business cycle.
The extraordinary C.I^G., instead, was created in 1968 with the 
aim of supporting industrial reorganization following a structural 
economic crisis.
The law for industrial reorganization in 1977 (law 675), 
underlined the role of the extraordinary C.I.G. as an instrument 
for industrial policy with the aim of encouraging the mobility of 
the labour force. For this purpose, special unemployment lists and 
training programmes for workers in the extraordinary C.I.G. scheme 
were instituted.
?irms can appeal to the extraordinary C.I.G. in case of 
sectoral or regional crisis, for industrial reorganization or 
transformation and, since 1977, also for crisis at the firm level.
The access to the extraordinary C.I.G. is free from any charge, 
no limit of time is fixed, and it pays the same subsidy to the 
suspended workers as the ordinary C.I.G..
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1.4.1. Economic consequences on the labour market and the 
economy as a whole.
The disagreggate unemployment series for the period 1970-1984 
(see table 4) give evidence of some interesting aspects of the 
effects of the instruments described above on the Italian labour 
market, we note, first of all, that this labour market is 
characterized by a low and decreasing level of subsidization to 
unemployment. That is because the labour force that has never been 
employed by a firm is not entitled to any subsidy. During the 70's 
and 80's, the category of first job seekers in particular has 
shown a more pronounced increasing trend (see fig. 8) than the 
other components of the unemployed labour force, thus reducing the 
percentage of unemployed receiving a subsidy. In 1970, for 
example, the employees laid-off and suspended from work were 25% 
of the total unemployed, against 19% of 1980 (but in 1984 the 
figure rose to 32% because of the massive use of the C.I.G.). In 
this percentage, moreover, are included the unemployed workers 
receiving 80% of their gross earnings, those who, being laid off 
individually, receive a subsidy which is worth 1/2 kg. of bread 
per day and those who, the 180 days having elapsed, do not receive 
any subsidy at all.
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UNEMPLOYMENT RATE. TOTAL LABOUR FORCE. COMPONENTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT.
UR: UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (It UNEMPLOYED OVER LABOUR FORCE); ISTAT 
UC: ‘ " NET OF C. I. C. UORKERSi DANK CF ITALY
LF: TOTAL LABOUR FORCEi THOUSAND WORKERSi ISTAT,
UDIS: LAID-OFF WORKERS I THOUSAND WORKERS» ISTAT;
UFST: FIRST JOB SEEKERS; THOUSAND WORKERS) ISTAT;
UO: OTHER UNEMPLOYED; THOUSANO WORKERS) ISTAT;
C.LC. WORKERS IN C. I.O. i THOUSAND WORKERS; BANK OF ITALY.
Ufi uc LF UDÌ 8 UFST UO CIO
1970: I ! 3. 40000 3. 43000 20183. OOOOO 336. OOOOO 434. OOOOO 391. OOOOO 9. 36896
1970: 2 ! 3. 30000 3. 33000 20219. OOOOO 231 OOOOO 376. OOOOO 332. OOOOO 9 60378
1970:3 ! 3. 30000 3. 60000 20719 OOOOO 243. OOOOO 493. OOOOO 431. OOOOO 14. 31734
1970: 4 i 3. 30000 3. 30000 20620. OOOOO 247. OOOOO 473. OOOOO 417. OOOOO 34. 20314
1971: 1 ! 3. 30000 3. 60000 20231. OOOOO 337. OOOOO 416. OOOOO 376. OOOOO 34. 11163
1971:2 ! 3. 30000 3. 70000 20443. OOOOO 2B6. OOOOO 363. OOOOO 336. OOOOO 73. 60238
1971: 3 i 3. 30000 3. 90000 20600. OOOOO 237. OOOOO 437. OOOOO 414. OOOOO 78. 24910
1971: 4 ! 6.r OOOOO 6. 30000 20326. OOOOO 236. OOOOO 303. OOOOO 437. OOOOO 77. 94142
1972: 1 : 6. 20000 6. 30000 20141. OOOOO 321. OOOOO 541. OOOOO 442. OOOOO 63. 19884
1972:2 ' : 6. 4000-3 6. 70000 20003:OOOOO 238. OOOOO 498. OOOOO 402. OOOOO 38746278
1972:3 1 6. 60000 6. 80000 20371. OOOOO 242. OOOOO 629. OOOOO 313. OOOOO 38. 83423
1972: 4 ! 6. 30000 6. 70000 20436. OOOOO 247. OOOOO 608. OOOOO 303. OOOOO 38. 83087
1973: 1 1 6. 90000 7. 10000 20096. OOOOO 343. OOOOO 323. OOOOO 484. OOOOO 43. 90379
1973:2 i 6. 70000 6. 80000 20339. OOOOO 269. OOOOO 466. OOOOO 638. OOOOO 29. 33323
1973: 3 i 3. 80000 6. OOOOO 20777: OOOOO 190. OOOOO 330. OOOOO 323. OOOOO 29. 96673
1973:. 4 1 3. 30000- 3. 70000 20730. OOOOO 189. OOOOO 323. OOOOO 497. OOOOO 39. 28783
1974: 1 1 3. 20000 3. 40000 20347. OOOOO 241. OOOOO 4SI. OOOOO 427. OOOOO 30. 48399
197.4:2 : 3. 20000 3. 40000 20394. OOOOO 176. OOOOO 408. OOOOO 331. OOOOO 40. 61047
1974: 3 ! 3. 30000 3. "90000 20913. OOOOO 134. OOOOO 330. OOOOO 467. OOOOO 76. 10737
1974: 4 3. 30000 6. ÌOOOO 21002. OOOOO 203. OOOOO 338. OOOOO 473. OOOOO 128. 12094
1979: 1 3. 70000 6. 6COOO 20807. OOOOO 247. OOOOO 480. OOOOO ' 414. OOOOO 189. 29639
1973:2 3. 90000 6. 80000 20646. OOOOO 230. OOOOO 416. OOOOO 496. OOOOO 177. 16731
1973: 3 I 6. OOOOO 6. 90000 21137. OOOOO 234. OOOOO 332. OOOOO 467. OOOOO 187. 31077
1973:4 1 6. 30000 7. 10000 21194 OOOOO 233. OOOOO 392. OOOOO 320. OOOOO 176. 73238
1976:1 ! 6. 30000 7. 30000 20673. OOOOO 248. OOOOO 347. OOOOO 314. OOOOO 161. 13362
1976:2 ; 6. 80000 7. 30000 20939. OOOOO 236. OOOOO 332. OOOOO 313. OOOOO 127. 03170
1976: 3 : 6. 90000 7. 30000 21889. OOOOO 239. OOOOO 632. OOOOO 612. OOOOO 87. 10307
1976: 4 ! 6. 90000 7. 20000 21614. OOOOO 236. OOOOO 661. OOOOO 632. OOOOO 76. 93897
1977:1 ì 7. OOOOO 7. 40000 21337 OOOOO 233. OOOOO 619. OOOOO 387. OOOOO 87. 16901
1977: 2 ì 7. 30000 7. 70000 21616. OOOOO 191. OOOOO 627. OOOOO 613. OOOOO 102. 41939
1977: 3 7. 30000 7 90000 21899. OOOOO 196. OOOOO 734. OOOOO 742. OOOOO 126. 92946
1977:4 1 7. 20000 7. 90000 21339. OOOOO 203. OOOOO 773. OOOOO 622. OOOOO 161. 99133
1978: 1 1 7. 20000 7. 80000 21389. OOOOO 231. OOOOO 734. OOOOO 333. OOOOO 146. 76313
1978: 2 i 7. 20000 7. 90000 21302. OOOOO 204 OOOOO 711. OOOOO 340. OOOOO 136. 63644
1978:3 ! 7. 30000 8. OOOOO 22117. OOOOO 208. OOOOO 840. OOOOO 610. OOOOO 146. 24698
1978:4 1 7. 30000 8. 10000 21914. OOOOO 203. OOOOO 364. OOOOO 382. OOOOO 140. 99142
1979: 1 ! 7. 60000 8. 30000 21613. OOOOO 269. OOOOO 843. OOOOO 318. OOOOO 131. 08926
1979:2 ! 7. 90000 8. 40000 21743. OOOOO 227. OOOOO 796. OOOOO 336. OOOOO 116. 29833
1979: 3 ! 7. 80000 8. 40000 22363. OOOOO 203. OOOOO 904. OOOOO 772. OOOOO 142. 83438
1979: 4 ! 7. 60000 8. OOOOO 22373. OOOOO 206. OOOOO 921. OOOOO 373. OOOOO 91. 76379
1980: 1 i 7. 60000 7. 90000 21978. OOOOO 248. OOOOO 903. OOOOO 332. OOOOO 91. 40234
1980: 2 7. 60000 8 ÌOOOO 22069 OOOOO 188. OOOOO 813. OOOOO 530. OOOOO 117. 43368
1980: 3 ! 7. 60000 e. 40000 22801. OOOOO 211. OOOOO 902. OOOOO 699. OOOOO 163. 13660
1980: 4 : 7. 60000 8. 30000 22642. OOOOO 200. OOOOO 939. OOOOO 583. OOOOO 212. 77783
1981: 1 : 8. ooooo 9 20000 22374. OOOOO 222. OOOOO 938. OOOOO 536. OOOOO 262. 4379»
1981: 2 1 B. 30000 9. 80000 22443. OOOOO 203. OOOOO 908. OOOOO 713. OOOOO 283. 08429
1981: 3 ! 8. 90000 10. 20000 22893. OOOOO 209. OOOOO 1003. OOOOO 801. OOOOO 302. 99948
1981: 4 : 9. 20000 10. 60000 22946. OOOOO 232. OOOOO 1144. OOOOO 720. OOOOO 342. 32283
1982:1 : 9. ooooo 10. 30000 22333. OOOOO 313. OOOOO 1149. OOOOO 623. OOOOO 301. 36603
1982:2 1 9. 00000 10. 40000 22634. OOOOO 271. OOOOO 1089. OOOOO 394. OOOOO 329. 28479
1982: 3 ! 9. 20000 10. 80000 22948. OOOOO 277. OOOOO 1202. OOOOO 640. OOOOO 333. 14124
1982: 4 : 9. 40000 11. ÌOOOO 22846. OOOOO 271. OOOOO 1221. OOOOO 618. OOOOO 376. 31946
1983: 1 : 9. 90000 11. 60000 MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU 398. 13763
1983: 2 1 9. 90000 11. 80000 fi ISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU 432. 84680
1983: 3 : io. ooooo 1 1. 80000 MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU 406. 28198
1983:4 1 10. 30000 12. 20000 MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU 406. 32294
1984: 1 ! 10. 60000 12. 40000 MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU 410. 00330
1984:2 : io. 30000 12. ÌOOOO MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU 424. 46674
1984:3 I 10. 20000 12. 20000 MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU 471. 26233
1984:4 : io. 20000 12. 10000 MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU 430. 96893
TABLE 4
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UDIS PLOTTED WITH * 
UFST PLOTTED WITH ♦ 
(JO PLOTTED WITH X 
CIO PLOTTED WITH V 
THOUSAND OF WORKERS
LAID OFF WORKERS 
FIRST JOB SEEKERS 
OTHERS





1970:1 Y * X ♦
1970: 2 Y * X + •
1970:3 Y * X ♦
1970:4 Y * X ♦
1971:1 Y ♦ X +
1971.2 Y * X +
1971:3 Y * X +
1971:4 Y * X
1972:1 Y ♦ X
1972:2 Y * X ♦
1972:3 Y * X ♦
1972:4 V * X ♦
1973:1 Y * X ♦
1973:2 Y « X
1973:3 Y * X ♦
1973:4 Y * X +
1974: 1 Y * X ♦
1974:2 Y * X +
1974:3 Y * X +
1974:4 Y # X ♦
1973: 1 Y * X ♦
1973:2 Y * •+ X
1973:3 Y * X ♦
1973:4 Y • X
1976:1 i Y ♦ X ♦
1976:2 . . Y * X «■
1976:3 I Y « X  *
1976: 4 Y . * X  *
1977: 1 Y « X ♦
1977:2 Y * X+
19771 3 Y *
1977:4 Y * X
1978:1 ! Y * X
1978:2 ; Y * X
1978:3 : Y * X
1978:4 Y * X
1979:1 Y « X
1979:2 Y * X
1 9 7 9 :3 Y *
1 97 9 : 4 Y • X
1980:1 Y • X
1980:2 Y * X
1980:3 : Y •
1980:4 } *Y X
1981:I i • Y X
1981:2 t * Y
1981:3 ! * Y
1981:4 * Y
1982:1 ! Y* X
1982: 2 * Y X
1 9 9 2 : 3 ■* Y X
1 9 9 2 : 4 * Y X
1 9 9 3 :  1 Y














According to these observations, explanations of aggregate 
unemployment based on the disincentive effects of the unemployment 
benefit system on the labour force would not seem to be relevant 
for the Italian case [8].
The comparison of the series of laid-off workers with that of 
workers in the C.I.G. scheme shows that, since 1975, firms have 
increasingly appealed to it, thus contributing to consolidate the 
intrinsic rigidity of the Italian labour market.
Since 1980, in conjunction with the process of structural 
change and the reorganization of the Italian industry, the number 
of workers "suspended" from work has become greater than that of 
laid-off workers. This phenomenon has regarded all industrial 
sectors, with a slightly higher concentration in the mechanical 
industry. Firms have appealed, in particular, to the extraordinary 
intervention of the C.I.G. so that its number of hours has 
registered an exponential growth from the late 70's onwards ( see 
fig.9a). The ordinary C.I.G., instead, has confirmed its role of 
stabilizer over the business cycle (see fig. 9b).
The following figures [9] might serve to give an idea of the 
phenomenon: in 1970 the total number of C.I.G. hours
(extraordinary and ordinary) was 25 million against 237 million in 
1980 and 670 million in 1983. In 1984 the number of workers in 
C.I.G. was 10% of the total employees of industry in the strict 
sense; the unemployment rate without them (ISTAT source) was 10%, 
with them it was 12% (Bank of Italy source)(see fig.10).
A — Hours of C.I.G. for extraordinary intervention
(Thousand hours)
B — Hours of" C.I.G.-for ordinary intervention
(Thousand hours)
Fig. 9
Source: V. Ceriani (1985)
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UNEMPLOYMENT RATES (X OF LABOUR FORCt)
C ! .C. WORKERS INCLUDED <SOURCE ISTAT): PLOTTED WITH *
C. I. C WORKERS EXCLUDED (SOURCE BANK OF ITALY): PLOTTED WITH X
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3 20000





1970:4 } ♦ X
1971:1 1 * X
1971:2 ' ♦ X
1971:3 J ♦ X
1971:4 S • X
1972:1 J ♦ X
1972:2 ! • X
1972:3 ? • X
1972: 4 J • X
1973: 1 : •* X
1973:2 i • X
1973:3 i • X
1973:4 5 * X
1974;1 J ♦ X
1974:2 { • X
1974;3 S • X
1974 4 S • X
1973: 1 J * X
1973:2 I « X
1973:3 ! • X
1973:4 l • X
1976: 1 i‘ • X
1976:2 i « X
1976:3 I ♦ X






































In conclusion# the main reasons why firms appeal and have 
appealed to this instrument are the following:
1) _ it transfers the costs of labour-hoarding from the private to 
the public sector (ordinary C.I.G.);
2) it has made possible the massive process of industrial
restructuration which has occurred in the period considered, 
allowing firms a wide margin of flexibility, relieving them of 
hiring and firing costs, sustaining demand and mitigating the 
social conflict ( extraordinary C.I.G.).
The drawbacks, however, have become more and more evident with 
time. If this scheme has fulfilled the task of supporting
industrial transformation, it has failed completely on the ground 
of promoting the labour mobility. The special unemployment lists 
and training programmes for people in the extraordinary C.I.G., 
which were instituted by the law of 1977, have never been
implemented, and this instrument has revealed to have the
characteristics of a pure unemployment benefit scheme. The 
workers in the C.I.G., who are still employed by the firm have no 
incentive to look for another job, given that they have to bear 
the risk of disposing of a certain income for an unlimited time, 
and a job which might eventually be reinstated. This system has 
generated alarmingly high costs for the public sector: in 1983,
for example, the deficit of the C.I.G. was 4% of the total 
financial requirements of the public sector.
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We can conclude that the market rigidity of the demand of
labour which has characterized particularly the industrial sector 
.suggests that firms have considered labour as a "quasi-fixed" 
factor of production [10]. Moreover, the distortions of the
Italian labour market were consolidated by the C.I.G., aggravating 
the discrimination between people who have been employed and 
first job seekers. This fact has confirmed the tendency of the
Italian Unions, which have strongly supported the C.I.G. scheme, 
to guarantee exclusively the insiders of the labour market,
disregarding the interests of the outsiders and, in particular, of 
young and female unemployment.
1.4.2. Collective bargaining and the role df unions in the 70's 
and 80's.
At the beginning of the 70's the Italian wage bargaining
scenario has the following characteristics:
1) the three confederations of workers (C.I.G.L., C.I.S.L. and
U.I.L.) bargain with the associations of firms over wage
indexation clauses (interconfederate agreements);
2) minimum contractual wages are bargained by the single
federations of workers at a national level and every three years 
(national agreements of categories);
3) wage agreements at the firm level and wage increases
unilaterally set by the firm determine the difference between
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actual wages and minimum contractual wages (the so called "wage 
drift").
Wage indexation
Up to 1975 wage indexation was proportional to the level of 
contractual earnings (gross of direct taxation) for each category 
of activity. The mechanism of adjustment was based on an ad hoc 
cost of living index ( the "sliding scale" index) which was 
calculated as a weighted average of the indexes of prices of goods 
and services in a special basket. Every quarter, the contractual 
wage was increased by an amount which was directly proportional to 
its level ( the "contingency point"). In such a way, all the 
percentage differences in wages were reproduced. These differences 
in wages depended, among other things, on the specific sectoral 
employment contracts, on the workers' qualifications, age and sex, 
and also had some territorial characteristics. Moreover there were 
some discrepancies between the wage indexation systems of 
agriculture, industry, private and public services.
In January 1975 the Trade Unions Confederations signed an 
agreement with the Confederation of Industrial Associations 
which completely changed the nature of the "sliding scale" 
mechanism.
The essential modification was that the contingency point was 
equalized across different industrial activities and employment
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contracts. The law no.91/1977 settled the matter definitively, 
extending the validity of this agreement to all employees, 
therefore abolishing all the differences between productive 
sectors. Since then, the increases in contractual wages were 
represented by a "fixed contingency point" which was the same for 
each employee and corresponded to that of the better paid category 
of industrial employees. Wage differentials were therefore 
reduced, thus favouring the low paid workers.
This measure was the product of the egualitarian principles 
that inspired the policy of the Italian trade unions from the late 
60's all through the 70's [11]. It marked the moment of trade 
unions' maximum power in industrial relations [12] .
Shortly after the implementation of this measure, the economic 
debate on the cost of labour concentrated on the issue of the 
degree of coverage of gross earnings and its relation to 
inflation. By coverage it is intended the ratio between changes in 
wages due to indexation and the changes in the sliding scale 
index.
From 1956 to 1973 the coverage on average was under 60% . The 
coverage has reached a peak of 100% in 1977 [13], and then
stabilized around 70% until 1983. It is to be noted, moreover, 
that if we consider the differences between the consumer price 
index and the sliding scale index in periods of accelerating 




The year 1980 signed a break in the advance of the Italian 
trade unions. The tendencies of the 70's were partially stopped, 
because the unprecedented high inflation rates combined with the 
indexation mechanism of the "fixed contingency point" flattened
wages and salaries up to a point which was no more acceptable by
workers themselves.
The recent return of interest in the non-automatic components 
of wages and salaries has its roots in the observation that the 
forces counteracting the wage equalization movement have been 
increasingly gaining weight in the recent past.
It has been noted that in the period 1977-1985 the increments
in wages that were unilaterally conceded by industrial firm to 
their employees reached their maximum and minimum values at the 
highest and lowest levels of labour skill respectively.
"Firms have favoured the employees with more 
responsability. The aim of this manoeuvre, which 
has taken place at the firm level, has been to 
counterbalance the egualitarian effects of 
collective bargaining and, above all, of the 
indexation mechanism." (Dell'Aringa and Presutto,
1986, pp.120-121).
The same authors have calculated that in the period 1976-1985 
the wage drift amounted to an increase of 6% in the average 
earnings of industrial white collar workers. These increments have 
halved the flattening effects of indexation clauses.
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We observe, to conclude, that the massive use of the C.I.G. and 
the widening of wage differentials which have characterized the 
80's have gone pari passu with the weakening of the Italian trade 
unions. From the second half of the 80's onwards, economists 
certainly face the task of reconsidering the unions' role.
Footnotes
1 See, for example, the yearly reports of the Bank of Italy and 
of the Ministry of the Budget.
2 See e.g. Momigliano and Siniscalco (1980, 1982, 1984);
Valcamonici (1985) ;• Bruno and Sachs (1982)..
3 That is not completely true for employment in the building- 
industry, which in 1984 represented 23% of total employment in 
industry. The trend of employment in this sector hss been 
steadily decreasing since 1970.
4 The employment series for the industrial sector is net of the 
workers who are under a special unemployment subsidy scheme 
(Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) as we shall explain at length in 
the next section.
5 See the I.S.T.A.T. series on the composition of investment per
sector of production: Annuario di Contabilita* Nazionale.
Several years.
The wholesale trade sector, in particular, has experienced a 
period of intense growth in the '80s. This is to be connected 
to the process of industrial restructuration, which has
involved the transferring of some functions (e.g. marketing) 
to newly created firms in this sector. See Fornari (1985).
6 Data on hourly costs of labour are only available for the
industrial sector.
7 A complete survey on the cost of labour and wages in the 70's
and 80's is in the A.S.A.P. Report (1986).
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8 They have been developed, in fact, in countries such as the 
U.K. were the unemployment benefit system covers a higher 
proportion of the labour force. (See e. g. Minford 1983).
9 These figure^ and graph 9 are taken from Ceriani (1985). The 
source is the Bank of Italy.
10 See Oi (1962).
11 Another important achievement of trade unions was the approval 
of the Workers' Statute (law 300/1970), a set of rules that 
guarantee the labour force and impose some constraints on 
firms.
12 For a complete survey of the wage indexation in Italy see 
Lungarella (1981).
13 It is of the same year (1977) the study by Modigliani and 
Padoa Schioppa about the management of an open economy with 
100 % plus wage indexation.
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CHAPTER 2 THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE FIRM
Introduction
«
The aim of this chapter is to lay the microeconomic 
foundations of the behaviour of the firm underlying our two-sector 
macro-model.
We shall start with the static production relations (sect.
2.1.) and then introduce dynamics in a step by step fashion, 
assuming first adjustment costs in the input of labour (sect.2.2) 
and, subsequently, in the capital stock (sect. 2.3.).
The theoretical analysis will enable us to derive the 
employment, price and investment equations of the econometric 
model presented in chapter 4.
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2.1. The static production relations
We assume that the supply side of the economy consists of two 
representative firms that produce two composite commodities: firm
1 produces a tradeable good (i.e. exposed to international 
competition)/ firm 2 produces a non-tradeable good (i.e. sheltered 
from international competition). Demand for the tradeable good 
produced by firm 1 depends on its relative price with respect to 
the competing good produced abroad. Demand for the non-tradeable 
good produced by firm 2 is independent of foreign variables.
The production function of the tradeable good is:
(I) f (L1 ,K1 ,M1,N:l)
where Y^ is the supply of output, L^is the input of labour, is
capital stock, is the input of imported raw materials and is
the input of non-tradeable good.
The production function of the non-tradeable good is:
(II) Y2= f(L2 ,K2 ,M2,T2)
where T2 is the input of tradeable good.
We start with the static relations and treat capital as fixed.
Firm 1
The firm minimizes costs subject to production function (1). 
From this minimization the firm's cost function is derived:
(2) C ^  C( W
where w^ is the cost of labour per worker, pm is the price of 
imported raw materials, p^ is the price of the tradeable good.
The firm then maximizes its revenue:
(3) max R1= P ^ “ ^
Y 1
The firm faces a downward sloping demand curve. Demand for the 
tradeable good (Y^) depends on the relative price of good 2 with 
respect to good 1 (Pj/P^)» on its relative price w.r.t. to the
Fforeign competitive good (p /p^), and on real aggregate 
expenditure (z/p^). That is:
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Now, the model works as follows. The firm sets its level of 
output such that marginal cost equals marginal revenue.
Translated into formulae, that amounts to set:
and solve the maximization problem (3) to get:
( 6 )
dR,
dY_ pi + dy
dPl dC
Yi - d F  - 0 1 1
or:
(7) 1 dCl mPl< 1 ‘ = ^  V  P ' P2' V  Kl’
which is the standard equilibrium relation between the 
monopolistic marginal revenue and marginal cost and represents the 
firm's pricing rule deriving from profit-maximization. e^ is the
price elasticity of demand for good 1.
dAs for labour demand (L^) we derive it applying duality theory 
and Shephard's lemma:
(5) (7) (8) form the structure of firm's 1 behaviour [1],
We can reduce it to our fundamental price equation substituting 
out in (7) with (4) thus obtaining :
(9) Px3 g(w1>pm,p2,K1,e1,pF,z)
and to our fundamental equation for labour demand substituting 
into (7) Ï derived from (8) so as to get:
(10) L^* h(p1 ,w1,pm ,p2,K1,e1)
For the homogeneity of degree 1 in,prices of the cost function 
and, by consequence, the homogeneity of degree zero of the labour 






If the production function exibits constant returns to scale in 
labour and capital (11) becomes [3] :
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d m
L1 ** W1 P(12) -i = h ( —  K P P ei>
d d Note that, in this framework, Y^' influences only if:
(13) ex= e(yj)
as it is evident from (12).
Let's see the implications of the two cases of constant and 
variable price elasticity of demand. From profit maximization we 
have:
1 dCl(14> P1< 1 - ̂  ■ V  V  pD' p2' V  V  =
which can be interpreted as a mark-up over unit costs c (i.e.
costs per unit of input) pricing-rule:
(15) px= c(w1 ,p“ ,p2 )
where itself is a function :
(16) Mx= M(e1,Y1 ,K1 )
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with constant by assumption. If is constant the mark-up will
increase i£ 7^ increases, because of the assumption of increasing
marginal costs (necessary condition for profit-maximization). That 
is:
di^
(17) -rr- > 0  e. constant.
1 1
The evidence, however, is that the mark-up over unit costs is 
rather unresponsive to demand fluctuations [4]. The extreme 
assumption that the mark-up over unit costs is completely 
unaffected by demand fluctuations would imply that the elasticity 
of demand for output depends on the level of demand in such a way 
that if demand rises the mark-up does not change. Substituting 
(13) in (16) this means:
dM dM de, dM
<l8) ^  = = °
Without constraining ourselves to the above extreme hypothesis, 




It is through this channel that demand variables affect labour 
demand, and we rewrite (12) as:
Firm 2
Firm 2 is not exposed to international competition. We 
therefore apply thé same model as for firm 1 the crucial
Fdifference being the exclusion of p from the demand for output 
equation (Y^).
(9), (12) and (12') will be the reference equations for our 
empirical analysis.
2.2. Introducing dynamics: adjustment costs in the input of
labour.
So far, we have assumed that labour is a completely flexible 
factor of production. We now proceed to relax thi3 hypothesis and
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assume that the firm incurs costs which are generated by the 
turnover of its employees. Such costs of hiring and firing 
employees are connected, for example, with advertising, 
interviewing, training, compensation for break of contract, loss 
of output due to vacancies (see e.g. Oi 1962, Rees 1973).
On the empirical side, the introduction of this assumption 
allows us to give theoretical foundations to the well estabilished 
econometric specification of labour demand which has between its 
regressors the lagged dependent variable.
Hence, demand for labour depends not only on current and 
expected exogenous variables but also on the existing "stock" • of 
workforce. This is the intrinsic dynamics of the labour demand.
Before proceeding to the analytical' derivations, one point more 
must be stressed.
As far as the structure of adjustment costs is concerned, the 
only assumption which allows to derive a testable labour demand 
equation is that of their strict convexity. In economic terms, 




Strictly convex adjustment costs 
in the workforce of the firm
Figure 1. exemplifies this concept and shows that if the firm 
splits a given rate of change of hiring over two years, say, it 
incurs in lower adjustment costs than if it realizes the same 
change in one year only.
Evidence on this issue, however, does not give strong support 
to the strict convexity assumption. There does not seem to be any 
particular reason why adjustment costs should not be linear.
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Nickell (1984) has developed a theoretical model of labour
demand with linear adjustment costs and found that the difference
between his model and that with strictly convex adjustment costs
is that the former never yields the equilibrium level of labour
demand (whereas the latter does), but always follows a partial
adjustment mechanism.
"The reason [however] for emphasising the 
crucial difference between the models is 
that when we come to empirical work, it 
turns out that the only tractable model is 
that with strictly convex adjustment
costs. If it happens to be the case that
in reality adjustment costs are more or 
less linear over the relevant range then 
the strict imposition on the data of a 
dynamic model derived under the assumption 
that such costs are strictly convex will, 
lead to. incorrect inferences being
drawn "(Nickell 1984, pp.29-30).
Having made clear this limit in the analysis of the demand for 
labour on which our model is centered, we shall now proceed to 
consider its analytical derivation.
2.2.1. Adjustment costs and the dynamic demand for labour.
We shall now consider the theoretical derivation of labour 
demand for firm 1 under the assumption of the existence of 
adjustment costs. Suppose that the firm faces costs of changing 
the "stock" of its workforce and maximizes the following 
discrete-time present value function where is the only
decision variable (i.e. Ifc is decided independently; for
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simplicity we assume a production function in L and K only and 
omit the subscript 1) :
where V is the present value of the sum of current revenue and
the stream of all future revenues, p is the price of output, w is 
the level of wages, r is the nominal interest rate, and b>0 is 
the quadratic adjustment costs parameter .
As in the preceding section we assume that supply and demand 
are in equilibrium at each.point in time so that the same kind of 
monopoly price equation holds (see sect.2.1. eq.7).





Pt 1 + r 1+Rt
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where R is the real interest rate and assume it to be constant 
and greater than zero.
We may define the equilibrium level of employment as that value 
corresponding to zero adjustment costs and linearize the f.o.c.
(2) around it.
For this purpose, let's impose some structure on the production 
function ( a Cobb Douglas function, for example) :
where A is a constant, a and c are the output elasticities of 
labour and capital respectively.
Let's define L as the employment level which would rule in the
 ̂ T*
absence of adjustment costs. Substituting (3) and setting b=0 in
(1) we derive the following first order condition:





If we linearize f around L we obtain:
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Substituting (6) in the f.o.c. (2) we get:
<7> <;>t ̂  < V  < > - <?>tb (V  Vi>
Lt
+ l+R (p )t+lb (Lt+l~ r,t J * °
and dividing by w/p :
(8) * 4  ( v  L l  ) " b (v  V i *  
Lt
i (w/p>t+i w
+ l+R <w/p)t b (Lt+l~ Lt ) = °
where:
—  * 0  < o . . .
Lt
since 0<a<l . Since we want to derive a linear difference
equation with constant coefficients, we assume:
(w/p).
—  = g+1(w/p)fc
constant and rewrite (8) as:
(8*) fi(L - L ) + — ® b (L - l ) a 0 ' ’ ^t-l' l+R 1 t+1 t'
1+gSet 31 h constant and assume 0<h<l
We can now derive the second order linear difference equation 
whose solution yields the optimal demand for labour of the firm:
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(9) b b Lt+1- [<l+h)b -0 ] Lt* b L * 0L*
where L* is given by (5). We shall now proceed to discuss the
solution to (9).
2-2.2 The solution.
Sargent (1979, ch.9) has shown the solution to problem (1) for 
the finite horizon case of i=0,...,T. He derives the system of 
Euler's Equations for i=0,...T-l and the terminal condition for 
i = T. To solve the second order difference equation (9) we 
need two boundary conditions. One of them is given by the 
historically given The other one is a necessary condition
for the optimality of the solution: the so-called "transversality 
condition". The solution yields a stable and an unstable root (one 
inside and one outside the unit circle), and in order to satisfy 
the transversality condition we have to set the coefficient on the 
unstable root equal to zero.
The solution is then s
oo
(10) Lfc = (l-/i) (l-h/£) (ty*)1 L*+ .
where^  is the stable root, function of h, a, 0  and b.
According to (10) employment is a function of its lagged value, 
the real interest rate (through h), the coefficient of adjustment
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to costs of hiring and firing (through ft which is influenced by 
b), the technology parameter ( v i a ©  which determines ^  ) and a 
geometric distributed lag of the current and all the future values
*of the equilibrium level of employment (L ).
2.2.3. The specification of expectations.
*
We now introduce uncertainty about the future values of L and 
rewrite (10) as :
00 t  
(10*) Lfc = (1"U) ii0 V t + i
We therefore have to specify the mechanism of expectation 
formation.
A partial adjustment mechanism follows from the assumption of
*static expectations, that i3 constant over time, and of
quadratic adjustment costs. That is, in our case :
(11) Lfc = J * V l + (1~ ^  {1_h^ ) Lt (I ^ M )
which yields:
(12) V  Vi* (1'̂  - W
*where L is given by (5).
We assume, instead, that firms have rational expectations about
*
the future values of equilibrium employment L and, by
consequence, about its exogenous determinants ( in this example
real wages and capital). Suppose that:
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(13)
where xfc column vector of the exogenous variables
*
determining Lfc. Assume the stochastic process generating these
variables to be a (n+l)t-vector first-order Markov process of the 
form:
(14) c + c1x. + c,x. , + ... + c ^.x. + v.— 1+1 —o —1— t —2— t-1 -n+1— t-n —t
which we write for convenience in matrix notation:
*t+l in Qo
• I 0 i * 0 0



















where c are matrices and c is the column vector of-1 -n+1 ~o
constants.
Or, more concisely:
(16) i t+1= A Xt + Vt
and we assume that the eigenvalues of A lie inside the unit 
circle. Assume, moreover, that :
(17) E ( Vfc) = 0
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then:
(is) tS t+l= I V S m >  ' ' a t ’ * *
where t i3 the information set containing current and lagged
variables.
More generally, (18) can be rewritten as:
(18') X = A 3 X. with s>0t~t+9 ~ ~t
If we specify a matrix £^=[1,0] where the dimension of I is 
that of the length of the x vector we can pick out:
(19) Bt *t+a= £i ^  ^
and from (13) derive:
<201 itC s  - S' V f s  + Et -t+s
Substituting (20) in (101) we obtain:
(21) Lfc =
OO
+ (1-/A) (1-h |tl) ^  (h [X)1 eL A 1 Xt+ Et ut+i]
which can be semplified to:
(22) Lfc = |LtI*t_1+ (1 -il) (1- h p  ) [g'v ex ( I - h {* A)_1Xt+
:|0 (t-t*)1
Equation (22) is an expression which is specified in terms of 
the observable values of the variables determining the equilibrium 
level of employment.
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In our model, production is a function also of raw materials 
and of the good produced in the other sector. That means that L is 
also a function of current and expected values of p^/p^and 
P2/Pl(we assume that they are used optimally). Since p̂  ̂ is a
*monopolistic price, !• is also dependent on real expenditure (and 
competitiveness if we are dealing with firm 1) if the price 
elasticity of demand is variable (see sect. 2.1).
We assume rational expectations and, using the technique 
developed above, substitute dut the expected values of the
*
exogenous determinants of L , so that their lagged values appears 
as explanatory variables in our equation (see (15) and (22)). Note 
that the error term can only be specified if we assume a specific 
generation process for u^ . We shall leave this problem to the
empirical analysis.
2.3. Introducing dynamics: adjustment costs in the capital stock.
So far, we have concentrated on the firm's demand for labour 
assuming the capital stock to be fixed and optimal utilization of 
the other inputs of production.
We now proceed to relax the hypothesis of the fixity of the 
capital stock, and turn to another fundamental issue in the
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analysis of firm's behaviour# that is the theory of investment 
decisions.
One way of laying sound microfoundations to the investment 
function is that of assuming the existence of adjustment costs in 
the capital stock. This approach has been developed by Eisner and 
Strotz (1963), Lucas (1967a), Gould (1968), Treadaway (1969) and, 
more recently, by Toshikawa (1980), Abel (1980) and Hayashy (1982) 
who linked it with the work by Tobin (1969).
In order to make the accumulation decisions dependent on the 
existing capital stock, they assume that there are cost3 
associated with adjusting the capital stock that increase 
exponentially with the absqlute size of investment.
Basically, there are two ways of introducing adjustment costs: • 
one is to assume that they enter as arguments in the production 
function (Lucas 1967a) and the other is to assume that they are 
subtracted separately to the revenue function in the present value 
maximisation problem of the firm.
In the former approach, which is usually referred to as non- 
separable or internal adjustment costs case, it is assumed that 
investment, requiring the same inputs needed to produce the final 
good in order to be put in operation, draws resources away from 
the productive sections of the firm thus causing current output to 
decrease. If the firm has decreasing returns to scale in labour 
and capital, progressively larger amounts of investment will cause
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increasing reductions in output. Under these hypothesis, the
production function may be rewritten as :
(1) Y = f(I,K,L)
where f ^ O ,  fR , fL>0 and
It is evident from (1), that these adjustment costs are 
interrelated with the production process, since the marginal 
products of L and K depend on I and viceversa.
In the latter case, of external or separable adjustment costs,
these costs are simply added to the firm's other costs.
We shall see in what follows how different assumptions on the 
adjustment costs lead * to different specifications of the 
investment function.
2.3.1. Separable adjustment costs.
In this case the firm maximizes the following present value 
function :
i
(J-l) V  i?o j?o |1+iW " 1eW  -
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subject to the capital accumulation constraint
t • * • t
where p^/p is the relative price of the investment good , C(.) is
the adjustment costs function, with C(0)=0, C'(I)>0, C ‘'(I)>0, and 
d is the rate of depretiation of capital assumed to be constant. 
The first order conditions are:
since [(l-d)/(l+rt )]<1.
Equation (3) is the equality condition between the marginal 
productivity of labour and the real unit cost of labour. (4) and 
(5') say that the firm will invest up to the point where the 
marginal cost of new investment equals the marginal increase in
(3) .fL (Kt ,Lt)= (w/p)t
By forward substitution (5) can be rewritten as:
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the value of the firm originating from that new investment (At).
We can therefore define the ratio of the marginal increase in the 
value of the firm due to a unit of new investment and the 
replacement cost of that unit of new investment as Tobin's 
marginal q, namely:
(6) qfc* Afc/ pIfc.
The investment function cam therefore be derived from (4) (see 
e.g. Hayashy 1982) as:
(7) It- c£(q-l)
which clearly states that when q achieves its steady-state value 
(q=l), gross investment .equals zero.
2.3.2. Non-separable adjustment costs.
With non-separable adjustment costs the maximization problem
is:
0*3 I{8-1> V  i?o jto "Vi'".«' W  ■
« I ' t . i V i  -
subject to the capital accumulation constraint:
-  fE,
(8.2) [ Kt+i- It+i- (l-d)Kt+i-1] * 0  for i=
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where f _ , f_.>Or f_<0; fT T,f__,fTT<0. The first order conditionsli K X X1I4 Mv X X
are:
(9) w v  v  - <;>t
do) p ^ V V  V  -pIt + \=°
I
‘11! V  J o  J?0 (1*t» i > ' 1 <1-d)1 Pt*i£K
In this case the current levels of investment and labour are
jointly determined [5]. Moreover, the marginal cost of one unit of
investment is equal to its price plus the corresponding loss in 
output.
If we assume constant returns to scale [6] and substitute L/K 
in (10) so that :
1121 V i 1 ^ ‘ I ’ t ' ^ t ’ - ' l ’ t 1 -  v  V 0
we get the following specification for the investment function:
(13) (|>t= . q t J
where investment is not only a function of current q, but also of 
current real prices for all inputs.
In our investment equation we shall substitute to q its 
function as given by (5') and (6).
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2.4. Expectation formation
We now turn to the relation between the preceding model of 
investment and the accelerator approach to investment theory.
Introducing adjustment costs in the accelerator model we get 
that investment decisions are taken according to the following 
relation:
111 V  (Wi> -.a V!
where is a convex combination of the desired capital stock
K*fcand the existing Kt_^:
(2) Kfc = R* + (1- f) »
where 0<7<1 and )f=l in the case of no adjustment costs. (1) and
(2) yield the so called "flexible accelerator" model of investment 
where:
(3) It= y(K* - ) + à Kt_L.
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Nickell (1978# ch.11) has shown that the multiperiod 
maximization of a revenue function with separable quadratic 
adjustment costs can be reduced to the expression:
O Q
(4) It« r { KJ + ( y'+rj/(l+r)
[K* - K* J - K ^ )  * d
where K* and K* depend on the expectation of all future values of
the real prices of the inputs.
Equation (4) states that:
" ...the firm aims at the desired capital 
stock for the next period plus an
exponential weighted sum of the
differences between the desired capital 
stocks for all future periods."(Nickell 
1978, p.259)
It is now clear that if real prices are assumed to be constant 
over time, those differences are equal to zero and we have the 
flexible accelerator model. Lucas (1967b) has shown how the same
model can be derived assuming static expectations and internal
adjustment costs. If we assume non-static expectations we can 
derive an equation like (4) above in all the future expected 
values of the desired capital stock Kt for i * t+1,..., c*o which,
in turn# depends on the expected future values of all the 
exogenous variables, that is:
€9
mtE (w/p)., fcE (p /p)if fcE (Pj/P)^ fcB ( r. )
for i= t+1, . . . , o«a .
Assuming rational expectations and a first order Markovian
generation process (see section 2.2.2.) for the exogenous
variables, substituting and linearizing testable investment
equation can be derived:
• •
(5) It- b0 + ¿  ali(«/p)t. 1 * »2i( p V p ) t.i+
• 1
1-0 ‘ji't-l •* i í
In the empirical part we shall stick to the standard assumption 
of external adjustment costs for labour. As far as capital is 
concerned, we test the alternative hypotheses of external or 
internal adjustment costs * in both sectors. As we have already 
seen, this will make a difference in labour demand, since 
investment will appear as one of its explanatory variables when 
adjustment costs for capital are non-separable [7].
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Footnotes
1 In order to justify the fact that we are not deriving the 
demand equation for the other variable inputs, we assume 
optimal use of and . This device, which is used in
empirical work to avoid the econometric estimation of the 
demand for those inputs, has its formal justification in 
duality theory. As M. Bruno 1978 p.3) puts it:
" Discussion of duality in production theory 
and in the analysis of costs and profit 
functions usually centers around 
'completely* dual structures. In other 
words, the relationships are analysed 
between the underlying production structure 
and its dual, where all quantities of 
commodities are replaced by their prices and 
viceversa. However, the same theory can also 
be extended and applied to 'mixed' systems 
in which a partial set of "primal" variables 
is replaced by their dual."
The production function (1) can be rewritten as:
Y1 = f(Lx ,KX ,Pm/Pl ,p2 /Pl ) 
mwhere p /p^ and are t*le relafcive price of imported raw
materials and of final goods respectively. This assumption 
justifies and does not change our following results.
d2 L can be expressed as a function of real prices. In fact, 
since C(...) is homogeneous of degree one,in prices dC/dY 
will be the same and we get:
(7' ) l-(l/e)= Cy (w/p,pm/p,p2/p,Y,K)
(8) is homogeneous of degree zero and therefore:
(8 ' ) Ld= ^(w/p,p?p,p2/p,Y,K).
So, (7') and (8'J yield (11).
3 In fact, if the production function exibits constant returns 
to scale the cost function may be written as :
C*= KC(w,p®,p2 ,Y/K)
and:
d dC* „ dCL = ---= K —dw dw
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from which we derive our result.
4 See e.g. P. Sylos Labini (1967) and K. Coutts et al.(1978).
It is to be noted, however, that in this literature marginal 
costs are usually assumed to be constant. We assume, instead,, 
increasing marginal costs.
5 Assuming for example:
fL= fL (L,K,I)= aALa-1KCg(I)
with 0<a<l, 0<c<l, g'(I)<0, g"(I)<0, we get:
H  = - [ aALa_1KC g'(I)]/[(a-l)aALa_1KC ]<0
6 With c.r.t.s. the production function is:
Y=f(L,K,I)=Kg(|,|).
Its derivatives w.r.t. L and I are: 
fL= gL/K(L/K,I/K); fx= gI/K(L/K.I/K).
The derivative w.r.t. K is:
£r = 9(L/K,I/K) - J 1 " K 3I/H '
which is obviously a function of L/K, and I/K.
7 Brechling (1975) and Meese (1980) have developped the formal 
solution to the model with adjustment costs in both inputs of 
labour and capital. The technique is analogue to Sargent's 
(1978).
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CHAPTER 3. THE DETERMINATION OF WAGES
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to review the present state of the 
theory of the determination of wages and derive our specification 
of wage formation.
We start with the competitive models of the labour market and 
present the Lucas microfoundations of. the Phillips, curve 
(sect.4.1).
We then discuss some recent competitive market theories of the 
labour market based on the "efficiency wage" hypothesis 
(sect.4.2).
Next, we build a simple competitive model of the labour market 
in order to compare its predictions with those of the non­
competitive model we use for the specification of our wage 
equation (sect. 4.3).
We proceed with the discussion of labour market models with 
unions and present different theories pertaining to this approach 
(sect. 4.4).
Finally, we derive the specification of wage formation for our 
two-sector model (sect.4.5).
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3.1. The Phillips curve and its microeconomic foundations
The Phillips curve is, we believe, one of the most popular 
examples in Economics of how an empirical finding, such as the
negative correlation between inflation and unemployment, can
rapidly gain a great success and be included in macroeconometric 
models without having a well developed theory to support it.
With the increasing instability of the empirical trade-off 
between inflation and ,unemployment [1], a decade after its
"discovery" in the late 50*s (Phillips 1958, Lipsey 1960), a 
substantial effort in the direction of the construction of its 
theoretical foundations was made. The coexistence of an
accelerating rate of inflation and a non-decreasing rate of 
unemployment was becoming a lasting feature in the economic scene 
which stimulated the reformulation of the Phillips relation. The 
idea was to take into account workers' concern about real wages 
by means of the introduction of inflationary expectations and 
explain why the Phillips curve could shift over time, thus 
determining an equilibrium rate of unemployment , the 'natural 
rate', which was consistent with an infinity of inflation rates.
The success of the 1958 Phillips curve had offuscated the 
notion of the labour market, especially because of the standard
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practice in macroeconometric models of relegating the 
determination of wages to a wage-price block. The late 60's, 
however, marked a revival of interest in the labour market and the 
joint determination of employment and wages, in conjunction with 
the development of the microeconomic foundations of the Phillips 
curve (Phelps 1967,1970).
In the '70s and 80's the literature on the microeconomic 
foundation of the Phillips curve reaffirmed, even more strongly, 
the labour market concept.
Basically, we may identify two categories :
1) the competitive models, where employment and wages are 
determined by the free market forces;
2) the non-competitive models where the level of wages may be set 
either unilaterally by unions (‘monopoly wage' models), or by 
means of a bargaining process over wages and employment between 
firms and unions (efficient bargaining models).
3.1.1. Competitive models of the labour market: Lucas'
model of the Phillips curve.
A significant example of the former category of models is 
Lucas' Phillips curve.
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Lucas' justification for the Phillips curve is derived from the 
interconnection of the concepts of the worker's intertemporal 
substitution between leisure and consumption (Lucas and Rapping 
1969) and misperception of aggregate shocks (Lucas 1973, 1975).
In Lucas-Rapping model the following worker's labour supply 
function (in logs) is derived from utility maximization [2]:
Lt* V  V"-p)r vvr p«r V - V pt*r v  V
where w is the nominal wage, p is the price level, r the nominal 
interest rate and a2 ,a3 measure the intertemporal substitution
effects betwieen working more now (in the future) and consuming 
more in the future (now).
This relation gives a 'micro' motivation for the Phillips
scurve: an unexpected increase in w fc and pfc, say, given rfc rises Lfc 
e e( since wfc+̂ and ate given) by a2+ a^> 0. Intuitively, this
means that an unexpected increase in current inflation following 
an expansionary manoeuvre decreases unemployment under its 
"natural rate" because the worker supplies more labour. If this 
relation could be embedded in a general equilibrium model with 
imperfect information, we would have a theoretical confirmation of 
Friedman's message that the Phillips trade-off holds only after 
unanticipated aggregate shocks (which may be the result of
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economic policy decisions) because of temporary money illusion 
effects which prevent the workers from realizing that their real 
wage has actually changed.
Bull and Frydman (1983) have shown that this unification of 
intertemporal substitution and misperception in a general 
equilibrium model is indeed possible. They derive Lucas' Phillips 
curve by integrating this micro-model of labour supply in Lucas' 
"island parable" according to which the economic agents can 
observe the local conditions of production but can only predict 
the current values of aggregate variables. That means that the 
labour demand in each micro-market is known with certainty, since 
it depends on the observable product wage. The labour supply is 
instead subject to uncertainty because the workers base their 
labour supply decisions on the consumption wage, which is a random 
variable since it involves the prediction of the aggregate 
consumption price (the workers are assumed to consume also other 
goods which are not produced on their 'island').
Hence, integrating the Lucas-Rapping model in Lucas' rational 
expectations-general equilibrium model with individuals' 
misperception of aggregate shock and market-clearing in both the 
labour and the product markets, we obtain Lucas' aggregate supply 
curve, whereby changes in output are a consequence of 
expectational errors following an unexpected shock in aggregate 
demand. The expectations-augmented Phillips relation is naturally 
derived inverting this supply function.
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This approach is theoretically perfect in that it supplies a 
complete microfoundation to the Phillips curve from the 
qualitative point of view. It suffers, however, from the heavy 
drawback that it is not confirmed by evidence. In other words, the 
concept of the worker who decides how much labour to supply today 
on the basis of his wage and price expectations for tomorrow and 
on the level of the rate of interest is not confirmed by the data 
(Altonji 1982, Ashenfelter and Card 1982, Andrews and Nickell 
1982)[3 ].
This criticism goes pari passu with the observation that in 
this model, the labour demand is fixed and it is the labour supply 
which has the task of reequilibrating the labour market after an 
unexpected policy shock, because' the introduction of uncertainty 
about the level of consumption wages makes it shift along the 
demand curve. This mechanism rules out the existence of 
involuntary unemployment which, instead, has always been, in our 
view, one of the most challenging and real problems economic 
theory is confronted with.
3.2. Alternative theories of the competitive labour market: the 
"efficiency wage" hypothesis.
Since one of the main qualities of an economic theory is to fit 
the stylized facts, it seems quite extraordinary that a lot of 
energies have been devoted to convince the economic profession 
that unemployment is essentially voluntary. One might think that 
the main reason of the failure of this sort of studies to explain 
involuntary unemployment is that they are founded on the 
assumption that the labour market is essentially competitive. In 
fact, even if imperfect information is introduced in that 
framework, such as in Lucas' of in certain implicit contract 
theories [4], it is hard to believe that a worker is involuntarily 
unemployed because if he "knew" more about the conditions of 
production he would not choose to remain idle.
There is a field of research, however, that retaininig the 
competitive market assumption has made some progress towards an 
explanation of involuntary unemployment. These theories are 
founded on the "efficiency wage" hypothesis.
We shall discuss them briefly before turning to the non­
competitive theories and to the discussion of the reasons why we 
believe that they offer a more convincing explanation of the 
stylized facts which have characterized the Western labour markets 
in the last fifteen years.
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The hypothesis of the "efficiency wage" is concerned with the 
explanation of why firms find it unprofitable to cut wages in the 
presence of invpluntary unemployment [5].
The central hypothesis is that the single worker's productivity 
is closely related to the wage he earns in such a way that the 
fir» may choose to retain a wage that is above the market clearing 
level, on the grounds that, by lowering it, it would reduce the 
average productivity of its workers and, by consequence, raise 
labour costs. Unemployment is involuntary because the unemployed 
worker keeps offering his labour, trying without any success to 
underbid his employed rivals.
The equilibrium wage lies* .on the profit maximizing labour 
demand curve, but persistently above the labour supply.
Basically, we identify three groups of models:
1) the quitting models. Because quitting imposes costs on firms, 
employers have an incentive to discourage it by rising wages.[6]
2) The shirking model. It is based on the hypothesis of imperfect 
information about the workers’ "on the job" behaviour:
In the competitive paradigm, in which all 
workers receive the market wage and there is no 
unemployment, the worst that can happen to a 
worker who shirks on the job is that he is fired.
Since he can immediately be rehired ( because of 
full employment) he pays no penalty for this 
misbehaviour. With imperfect monitoring and full 
employment the worker will choose to shirk. To 
induce its workers not to shirk the firm attempts 
to pay more than the 'going wage'. Then if a 
worker is caught shirking he will pay a penalty.
If it pays one firm to raise its wage, it will pay 
all firms to raise their wages. When they all 
raise their wages the incentive not to shirk again
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disappears. But as all firms raise their wages 
their demand for labour decreases and unemployment 
results. With unemployment, even if all firms pay 
the same wage a worker has an incentive not to 
shirk. For, if he is fired, he won't obtain 
immediately another job. The unemployment rate 
must be sufficiently large that it pays workers to 
work rather than take the risk of being caught 
shirking." (Shapiro and Stiglitz,1984,p.433)
3) The adverse selection model. It is based on the assumption of 
imperfect information about the intrinsic productivity of each 
worker. If workers differ because of the degree of their ability 
they are likely to have different reservation wages. The firm, in 
order to screen itself from bad workers, will choose the policy of 
offering higher than average wages so as to attract more able 
job candidates (Weiss, 1980)..'
4) The gift exchange model. It is a sociologically oriented 
explanation of the occurrence of higher wages based on the 
concepts of loyalty of the firm towards the group of its most 
capable and faithful workers in the form of higher pay in exchange 
of higher quality of labour services (Akerlof,1982).
These models, therefore, are concerned with involuntary 
unemployment. Although no explicit macromodel exists, the 
explanation of the rise in unemployment in the 70's one can draw 
from them is that firms, given their concern for attracting good 
workers and for keeping their morale high, did not reduce real 
wages enough to cope with the increase in input prices and the 
productivity slowdown.
We think that this interpretation is not convincing. The major 
criticism is that it is seldom observed that firms set wages 
unilaterally# since in most European countries at least, 
collective bargaining is the basic determinant of wages (7).
Our main focus, therefore, will be on the non-competitive models 
of the labour market which make a more substantial effort to
explain what we observe in the real world; we devote to them a
large part of this chapter and base on them our econometric
specification of wage formation . We want, however, to show first
a very simple version of a competitive model of the labour market 
in order to compare its predictions with those derived from the 
non-competitive models we shall discuss later.
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3.3. A competitive model of the labour market
It is convenient to start with a simple model of the labour 
market where wages and employment are determined by the demand 
for and the supply of labour. In order to make our comparison with 
the non-competitive models we shall derive later (sect. 3.5) we 
just need a very naive specification of the labour supply function 
and therefore we ignore the intertemporal substitution 
assumption.
Let's recall our two-sectors hypothesis of section 3.1 and 
assume that there is perfect competition both in the labour market 
and the output market. The sectoral demand for labour is derived 
from the profit maximizing behaviour of the firm as follows [8]:
(1) max P iY i"
L
(the subscript i refers to the sector :i=l,2) 
subject to:
Y i* fiLj,!^)
C l ^  w^l+T.)
where Y is output, L is labour, K is capital stock, p is the 
product price, cl is the cost of labour per employee inclusive of 
employers contributions (T) and w is the nominal wage.
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The demand for labour is derived from the first order condition
(2) PifL( L^K.) * C ^
which yields the standard neo-classical demand for labour:
.•t .d ,dr,cl. _ *(3) L 3 L K j 1l p l l
As for labour supply, we have to stress first that we are not 
going to explain any participation phenomena. Throughout our 
analysis, therefore, the labour force will be an exogenous 
variable and we condition the labour supply of this competitive
model on it.
We assume the sectoral labour supply to be a positive function
of the consumption wage, defined as the ratio of gross earnings
per employee (i.e.inclusive of direct taxation) over an index of
the cost of living (p ). Moreover, the worker, when confrontedc
with the decision of how much labour to supply to a firm in one 
sector, makes a comparison between what he would earn there and 
what he would get if he worked for a firm in the other sector or 
if he stayed unemployed. On this basis, we introduce between the 
exogenous variables determining the supply of labour the
a"alternative wage" (w ) and the unemployment subsidy (b).
The supply of labour equation is therefore:
p*where g represents the proportion of the total labour force (L ) 
which is supplying its labour to the sector under consideration.
Assuming constant returns to scale in production and taking a 
leg-linear specification we rewrite (3) and (4) as (we omit the 
subscript i for convenience):
(5) In aQ- a ^ n t ^ )  + In K
and
(6) In L3* cQ+ c ^ n i ^  )- c2lh wa- Cjin' b + In Lp
We can rewrite (6) as:
(7) In LS=c q+ c^ln - c2lnwa- c3lnb + c ^ n p  - c ^ n p  + lnLP
c
Equating (5) and (7) and solving for In cl/p we get:
a - c 1 K c ( 1+T)pcl o o 1__ i ______ E
(8) ln( — ) - ~ + n + * + e LP + a + c n d
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It is worth commenting this relation at some length since some 
of the explanatory variables of the real cost of labour are 
crucial in the non-competitive model as well.
basically accounts for two effects on the real cost of labour:
1) the influence of the discrepancy between the deflator used by 
the workers to calculate their consumption wage and that used by 
the firm to derive its product wage;
2) the influence of the burden of direct and indirect taxation. 
This term also measures the influence on wages of the price of
imported final goods. In fact, since the consumer price index is a 
weighted average of the index of prices of domestic and imported 
goods, c^/fa^+c^) accounts for the effects of changes in the terms
of trade on the consumption wage and, by consequence, for the rise 
in the workers' pressure over the nominal wage which increases 
the product wage. In particular, considering explicitly all forms 
of taxation and defining the consumption wage as:




and the consumer price index as:
(10)
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where is taxation on employers, T2and T3 are direct and
indirect taxation rates respectively, P ^ p ^ 3 the price of imported
final goods in domestic currency and a, b are the shares in value 
added of domestic and imported goods respectively, we get that the 
wedge i s :
C  1 _ T 2  P i m n  h(11) d * — —  a ------------  ._irnp b
cl/p (1+T )(1+T ) ' p }
which linearized becomes:
p .
(12) d « 1 - Tx- T2- T3- b i-^512)
The term d measures the total wedge between the consumption and
the product wage.
In our two-sector economy with a domestic tradable good and a 
domestic non-tradable good, in order to get the total wedge of one 
sector we have to add to (12) the relative price of the other 
domestic good multiplied by its relative share in value added.
The terms wa and b exert a positive pressure on the cost of 
labour given the way they enter our labour supply function.
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The ratio of the capital stock to the labour supply has a 
crucial role in accounting for the influence of the secular rise 
in the productivity of labour. The sign of its coefficient ■ is 
positive, since a higher productivity of labour due to an increase 
in the capital stock will induce an upward shift in the demand for 
labour and, therefore, an increase in the real wage.
Now that we have the labour demand and the wage equations, we 
can derive the predictions of this model about unemployment.
Let'3 define the unemployment rate as [9]:
(13) u = In LP- In L * In LP+ ln(L1+ L2 )
Substituting (3) for i=l,2 and the solution for (cl/p)^ in
(13), we get that unemployment is a function of the exogenous 
variables determining the labour demand and the labour supply in 
the two sectors.
Moreover, had we assumed imperfect competition in the labour 
market, aggregate demand would have entered as a.determinant of 
the demand for labour (see sect.3.1). Through this channel 
aggregate demand shift would have influenced the unemployment 
rate. The intertemporal substitution hypothesis implies this 
effect as well, even assuming perfect competition in the output 
market. The labour supply function of section 3.1.1 is in fact 
coupled with a competitive labour demand. The policy effects on
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unemployment come through their infuence on the real rate of 
interest which is an argument of labour supply.
Finally, it is trivial to add that there is no room in this 
model for involuntary unemployment. If the market clears, 
unemployment is simply voluntarily chosen leisure. In this sort of 
model involuntary unemployment can arise only when the government 
introduces some rigidities or distortions such as administered 
minimum wages (Hamermesh 1980, Meyer and Wise 1983), or different 
types of employment subsidies (Johnson and Layard, 1984).
Since we are mostly concerned with the issues of market 
determined wage rigidities and involuntary unemployment, it is to 
those theories that we shall now turn.
3.4. The role of unions; the bargaining theory of the labour 
market.
The role of unions in the labour market is not a new topic in 
economic theory. The interest in this issue dates back at least to 
the mid '40s with the works of Dunlop (1944), Leontief (1946) and 
Ross (1948).
In these studies unions start to be seen as entities with a 
well defined set of preferences, the real counterpart of firms.
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Since then the subject has been more or less ignored until 
quite recently. With the increasing difficulty in explaining the 
economic performance of the Western countries, . economists have 
realized that such important economic subjects as unions could no 
longer be ignored .
In the late '70s and in the '80s, therefore, we have assisted
to the consolidation and refinement of the microeconomic theory of
trade unions [10]. This theory turned out, last but not least, to
serve as a new microfoundation for the Phillips curve.
A lot of work, however, remains to be done on the empirical 
side. The econometric literature has just started to emerge and it 
seems that, until now, there has not been a lot of progress on 
this ground [11]. We shall come back to this point later on in the 
chapter.
In its most general terms, the theory of trade union 
behaviour is concerned with the effects on wages and employment of 
bargaining between the firm and its unionized members.
The firm is assumed to have a utility function over profits and 
the union over wages and employment [12]. Depending on the 
bargaining rule we can consider three cases:
1) the firm sets employment and the union sets the wage (monopoly 
union model);
2) the firm sets employment and then both the union and the firm 
bargain over the wage ( the'right to manage'model);
^03x0/?
%
3) the firm and the union bargain over both the wage and*^,.
i  r 7
I  /  ■ : /
^ / S d 3 ^
employment (the 'efficient bargaining'model).
The obvious theoretical tool for the analys.is of the interplay 
between two parties is to be found in game theory. The most 
popular formal solution to a bargaining problem is Nash's.
According to his result , the function to be maximized is the 
product of the parties gain over the non-bargaining outcome [see 
appendix A]. The Nash solution is the best suited to derive the 
equilibrium wage and employment of the three types of bargaining 
problems we have mentioned above.
We obtain the three models as special cases of a general 
specification of the Nash solution :
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b _
(1) max [v(iTfw,L)) - V(jr)J[u (w,L) - 0 J
where L is employment, w is the real wage, V and U are the utility 
functions of the firm and the union respectively; are profits
JV and U are the fall-back levels of profits and unions utility 
if no bargaining takes place; b is a parameter. The two 
differences represent the firm's and union's gain over the non­
bargaining outcome.
The maximization of (1) with respect to L and w yields the 
efficient bargaining solution. Assuming L to be the labour demand 
function, that is L=L(w), the maximization of (1) with respect to
w yields the 'right to manage'model. Assuming L-L(w), b=0 and
maximizing (1) with respect to w we get the monopoly union 
outcome.
Let's discuss the three cases in detail.
3.4.1 The efficient bargaining model.
In this model (McDonald and Solow, 1981) the firm and the union 
bargain over both the wage and the employment levels. The 
equilibrium value of employment L* and real wage w* are found * * * 
making use of Nash's solution, that is solving the maximization 
problem (1).
For simplicity, let's assume that:
(2) V (Jt)»JT= R (L) - w L
where R is the revenue function and R'(L)>0, R"(L)<0 ;if no
bargaining takes place the firm does not employ any worker and has 
no revenue:
(3) n *  0 , V (0)=0;
93
the workers are all identical and the union's utility is the same 
as the sum of their individual utilities:
(4) U( w, L) = L u( w ) and U * L u
wivsre u is the worker's utility function; 5 is the worker's fall­
back utility if he does not work for that firm and might be 
determined by employment benefits and/or by an alternative wage 
but, for the moment we write:
«
(5) u * u ( w )
where w represent*any alternative wage.
Given these assumptions, the maximization problem (1) can be 
rewritten as:
(6) max [ R( L ) - w L] [ u(w) - u(w) ] L
L,w
Maximizing with respect to L yields:
(7) R '(L) - 2 w L + R(L) = 0
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so that the real wage is given by:
(8) w * (1/2)[ R(L)/L + R*(L)]
Hence w is a decreasing function of L because of the form of 
the revenue function.
Maximizing (6) w. r. t. w yields:
substituting R(L)= - R'(L)L + 2wL from (7) in the r.h.s. of (9) 
we get:
(10) yields the so called "contract curve" which is upward 
sloping in the L,w plane.
The intersection of (8) and (10) gives the Hash equilibrium 
solution L* and w*.
The economic intuition behind this analytical solution is as 
follows.
The firm is a profit maximizer and it is indifferent between 
the combination of employment and wages that leave its level of 
profits constant. That is:
(9) L [ u(w) - u (w )]/ u'(w) = —R '(L )L + 2 w L - w L
(10) [u(w)-u(w)]/ u*(w) * w - R'(L)
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(11) R( L ) - w L * C
There are an Infinite number of these isoprofit curves (see 
fig.l) and the lowest denotes the highest level of profits, since 
for any given L a lower w means higher profits. The firm's demand 




The union has M identical members; L of them are employed by 
the firm. The expected utility of a union member is:
The union is indifferent between different combinations of w,L 
which leave the total gain in utility from employment constant, 
i.e.:
Graphically, the equilibrium values L* and w* are given by the 
tangency points of the firm's isoprofit curves and the union's 
indifference curves. Their locus defines the "contract curve".
Finding the slopes of (11) and (13) in the L,w plane and 
equating them we get:
(12) e(u)*(L/M) u(w) + [ (M - L)/M ] u(w)
(13) L ( u(w) - u(w) ) = g
(14) u(w) - u(w) _ w - R (L)
u (w) t L
equal to (10) which we derived using the Nash bargaining function.
Another interesting iterpretation of this result is that the 
worker, whose expected utility is:
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(15) p u(w) + (1-p) u(w)
where p=L/M is the probability of being employed by the firm,
equates at equilibrium, the marginal utility of one unit more of
income multiplied by the probability of being employed with the
marginal loss derived from the increased probability of not
finding a job given his new request.
In formulae this is:
(16)
and:
(17) d(l-p) _ _ d£
dw dw
(16) implies again the Nash solution since
substituting p=L/M in it we get:
(18) u(w) - u(w) M dw «
u (w) L dL
where dw/dL is the slope of the isoprofit curve which then yields 
the contract curve [14].
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If such contracts are enforced in the labour market, the 
employer will, in all probability, be off his labour demand curve. 
In fact, the contract curve coincides with the labour demand curve
at w only, which can be interpreted as the competitive level of 
the real wage. Otherwise, at any other equilibrium point, the wage 
is higher than the marginal productivity of labour. The efficiency
of the contract lies in the fact that both the firm and the union
are better off if they choose an agreement on the contract curve 
than in any other region of the L,w plane (Pareto optimality is
achieved) [15]. Here, as in many models that attempt to explain
wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment, it is assumed that- a 
perfect insurance market does not exist. If it existed,, workers 
could go and insure themselves against the fluctuations in their 
income. Here, instead, workers look for an indirect way to 
overcome this market imperfection. From this observation Oswald 
(1985) draws the intuition as to why a Pareto-optimal wage bargain 
is likely to increase employment rather than reduce it:
"In an ideal world each union member 
would like to purchase full insurance - that 
is , insurance which equates his or her 
marginal utility of income across all states 
of nature - against the risk of 
unemployment. That possibility is assumed 
away here: an unemployed person receives
only government benefit, b. There is a way 
to achieve insurance indirectly, however, 
because the union can reduce the risk of any 
individual being laid off. Hence it sets 
employment above the level which it would 
desire if insurance markets were perfect 
(that is also the competitive level).
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Overemployment is rational; it is the 
optimal way to reduce risk at the expense of 
technical efficiency."
The question concerning which point on the contract curve will 
be chosen is merely a matter of power: higher levels of wages and 
employment will be the signal of a more powerful union, whereas a 
more profitable firm is behind lower levels of both these 
variables. To derive a unique solution we therefore need a rule 
determining the distribution of revenue between the employer and 
the workers.
In our Nash solution this sort of "equity locus", as McDonald 
and Solow (1981) call it, is given by (8), which states that the 
real wage is equal to the mean of the average and marginal revenue 
product of labour.
Once the formal structure of the efficient bargaining model is 
set up, it is possible to see how the equity locus and the 
contract curve shift with aggregate demand changes. If these 
changes cause the two loci to shift in an offsetting fashion it is 
possible to explain the stylized fact of wage rigidity and 
employment fluctuations over the business cycle.
Let's now turn to the two other bargaining models.
1 0 0
3.4.2. The right to manage model and the monopoly union model.
We consider now the case of the firm setting employment 




(20) L* * L*(w)
In the right to manage model the firm sets employment and 
bargains over wages with the union ( Nickell and Andrews, 1983). 
Although this model has the appealing property of being more
realistic than the other two, it yields the same predictions of 
the monopoly model: the explanatory variables of the wage level
and their predicted sign are identical. On this issue there are 
some problems which have not been settled yet.
For simplicity, we shall concentrate on the monopoly model 
which will be the basis of our empirical specification.
Using the same simplifications of section 4.4.1, the
equilibrium combination of wages and employment is given by the 
tangency point of the labour demand curve wijth the union's
indifference curve (see fig.2 ).
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The labour demand curve is given by:
(21) . R'(L) - w = 0
The solution is therefore:
(2 2 ) u(w) - u (w ) _ L R"(L) 
u (w) w w
(22) says that the reciprocal of the elasticity of 
employment with respect to wages is equal to the wage 
of demand for labour taken positively.
Fig. 2




3.4.3. Some critical observations on trade union theories.
It is now time to ask if the above models supply an explanation 
for the existence of involuntary unemployment and wage rigidity.
The models where the firm sets employment say that the 
equilibrium wage is on the labour demand curve, but above the 
competitive level, because of the action of the union which exerts 
some of its monopoly power. Wage rigidity with respect to demand 
changes arises only if specific assumptions on the structural form 
of the labour demand function are made, such that the wage 
elasticity of demand in (22) is constant.
The efficient bargaining model , as we have seen, predicts 
overemployment, thus failing to give an answer to one of the two 
crucial issues. Wage rigidity, as in the monopoly union models, 
arises only if specific parameters are chosen such that the
contract curve and the equity locus shift in am offsetting way 
after demand shocks.
As far as the bargaining set up of the efficient bargaining 
model is concerned, the criticism that is usually raised about
this model is that it is not clear if, in reality, unions bargain
about the level of employment. There are some papers based on
survey data which yield contradictory results for Britain [16]. 
Nickell and Andrews (1983, p.509) say on this point:
103
Since the previous model [the monopoly 
model] does not have this rather appealing 
property [ Pareto efficiency], it is worth 
considering why firms might wish to impose 
the negotiating rule that they will only talk 
about wages when the outcome is such that
futher discussion about employment could 
yield higher profits without impairing the
union’s welfare. One powerful argument is 
that, as we have already noted, firms find it 
desirable to make continuous adjustment to 
their total level of employment. They would 
presumably find the idea of continual 
negotiation on this issue, with possible
discussion on wages thrown in, as simply too 
costly an interference with their managerial 
function."
And also (p. 510):
This model has the strong implication that a 
rise in union power will raise employment.
Since we know of no evidence either, in our 
results or elsewhere, to support this 
contention, this is an additional reason for 
not pursuing this particular model any 
further."
The monopoly union model, on the other hand, has the 
unrealistic feature that unions set the wage without having to 
negotiate with firms.
It must be added that there are some special cases in which 
efficient bargains and monopoly equilibria are identical, that is 
they lie on the labour demand curve. These special cases arise if 
the union's indifference curve has some flat segments and it 
touches the firm's isoprofit curve there. In this case the 






When is the union’s indifference curve flat?
One possible explanation might be given using the "seniority " 
model (Grossmann 1983). This model is based on the assumption that 
lay-offs follow a "last in first out" rule and that the union 
takes its decisions according to a majority rule. Hence# if the 
majority of its members are senior workers in the firm and they 
are mostly concerned with wage increases, the indifference curve 
of the union will be flat starting from the median seniority 
voter.
Once account is taken of the institutional setting of the 
specific sector or industry under study, the last word about the
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superiority of one model over the other is left to econometric 
testing.
Some econometric studies about specific industries or sectors 
are already available [17]. What seems to be quite a difficult
task, is to construct a statistical test that would allow to
reject either the efficient bargaining model or the monopoly union 
model. Ashenfelter and Brown (1985) and Card (1985) use the 
following method.
Since wage and employment in the efficient bargaining model are 
jointly determined, all the variables determining wages should 
influence employment and viceversa. In the monopoly union model,
instead, the wage is chosen given the .level of employment. If
%  •  
empirically, it turns out that employment is not affected by the! 
variables determining wages, then one might not reject the 
hypothesis of a monopoly union framework.
These are only preliminary results, however, and a lot of work 
is required before we can confidently rely on them.
After this rapid survey of trade union theories of wage 
determination and related criticisms, we turn to the details of 
our specification.
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3.5. Our specification of wage formation.
We have considered so far some micro-theories of trade union 
behaviour. We shall proceed now to derive the specific wage 
equations we are going to estimate in the empirical part.
We have chosen the monopoly union framework mainly for one 
institutional and one theoretical reason.
The former is that the Italian labour market in the period
- 1970:1 1984:4 which we want to study is characterized by a mixture 
of sector-wide and firm-level bargaining. It is in a median 
position, with France, Great Britain and West Germany, between 
the highly centralized collective bargaining of the Scandinavian 
countries and the decentralized bargaining coupled with large non­
union sectors of the U.S., Canada and Japan. Moreover, in the
period studied and particularly during the '70s, unions have
considerably increased their contractual power and deeply affected 
the performance of the Italian economy [18].
The latter is that the monopoly union model is the only one,
among those we have considered, that explains involuntary 
unemployment, given that we exclude the efficiency wage models on 
the grounds that the assumption of firm wage-setting does not Cit 
the Italian case in the period studied (see, however, ch.l where 
we mention the rising weight of wage drift in the determination of 
labour costs).
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We assume that the economy consists of two sectors. Each sector 
has its own union which has the task to set the level of the real 
wage. Profit maximizing firms set the employment level in such a 
way that their labour demand is :
(1) Ld= L ( w(l+t)/p, p?p, K, e )
qp
where L is the number of workers, w is the nominal wage level, t
is the taxation rate on employers, pm is the index of prices of 
imported raw materials, K is the capital stock, e is the price
qp
elasticity of demand for output.
The monopolistic role of the union may be interpreted in the 
Italian institutional framework as follows.
Any worker willing to be employed may choose to register with 
his local employment agency ( a public institution) which puts 
him in a waiting list for the requested sector of the economy. 
Every worker registered with the agency will be guaranteed all the 
advantages (national collective labour contracts, training 
schemes, etc.) achieved with collective bargaining.
Since in Italy registration with the union itself is not 
compulsory [19], we can't use 'membership' to represent the number 
of workers the union actually cares about. We assume, instead, 
that the union is concerned with the welfare of the workers 
employed in its sector, L, and of the workers registered with the
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employment agency for that sector, whose number we denote by M-L>0 
All workers in each sector are assumed to be identical and to 
have a concave utility function. The argument of the utility 
function of the worker if he is employed in the sector considered 
is the difference between the consumption wage and a baseline
real wage w which captures the fact that the subsistence real wage 
has risen steadily over time with the secular increase in 
productivity. That is:
(2) u = u { w/pc~ w )
where p is the consumer price index. In this way, the worker c
is assumed to base his requests on a relative magnitude, since he 
is able to observe the secular characteristics of the increase in 
wages.
Each of the M-L workers who are not employed in this sector may 
find a job in the other sector or stay unemployed. We denote their
fall-back utility, which we are going to explain shortly, by rx 
The union seeks to maximize the welfare of the M workers in its 
sector in the form of the following expected utility fuction:
(3) U = L u (w/p - w ) + (M - L) uc
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We choose this utility function to skip the problem of 
considering M as depending either on the union's behaviour or 
being merely exogenous. Maximizing (3) with respect to w/Pc in
fact, does not involve M. It would make no difference to have (3) 
or an expected utility objective function as we had in sect. 3.4.2 
if we assumed M to be exogenous [20].
3.5.1. The outside opportunity of the worker.
The u term represents the worker's opportunities outside the 
sector. Intuitively, these will depend on the state of the labour 
market, whose best indicator is the unemployment rate. In fact, 
the higher the unemployment rate, the lower the probability of a 
worker who is not employed in one sector, to find a job in the 
other one, and, by consequence, the lower the pressure of the 
union on the real wage of the sector considered. Moreover, a 
considerably highex wage in the other sector will exert a positive 
pressure on the consumption wage.
We rewrite the union's utility function to take into account 
these facts:
(4) 0 * 1 .  U< w/p - w ) + (M-N) [(UR v(b) + (1-UR) v(w*)) - w ]c
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where v is a utility function, UR is the unemployment rate, wa is 
the alternative wage, b is the unemployment benefit and:
u = [(UR v(b) + (1-UR) v(wa )) - w]. 
aThe introduction of the w term in the union's utility function 
measures what has been called a "direct jealousy effect" by 
someone ( Oswald 1979) or a "solidarity policy" wage effect by 
some others (Edgren, Faxen and Odhner 1973)[21]. It measures the 
interrelation of wages in different unionized sectors due to 
unions following each other’s wage increases.
A formal .justification of the introduction of the outside 
opportunities in the'union's utility function can also be found in 
bargaining theory. In many of the models we have just considered 
we may invoke the "outside option principle" which says that the 
determinants of the outside option available to the partner who 
decides to quit bargaining influence the bargaining outcome 
(Sutton, 1985).
In this light we can interpret u as the union's threat point 
and state that its determinants will influence the negotiated real 
wage. We therefore have a microeconomic justification for the 
variables which have often been added in the Phillips-type wage 
models in a rather ad hoc way [22].
Moreover, we may use another property of the "outside option 
principle" to discard the rational expectations argument of the
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Inexistence of the Phillips curve in a perfectly informed 
environment. This argument says, as we have already seen, that 
rational agents will not wait to see the effects on the 
unemployment rate to renegotiate a contract after a nominal shock, 
but will recalculate, immediately after the news, the equilibrium 
values of the nominal variables, in such a way that no trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment takes place. The property of 
the outside option principle says that only threats that are 
credible will have an effect on the bargaining outcome (Sutton, 
Shaked and Binmore, 1985). ^hat is required, instead, by the 
rational expectations solution, as Pissarides puts it (1985, p. 
388):
...in the present bargaining environment 
is that the union should be capable of 
drawing the firm into negotiations for 
raising wages because in some future date 
wages elsewhere would be higher. But since 
wages elsewhere [and unemployment] are 
important in the union's threat point, it 
seems natural for the firm to refuse to 
engage in such negotiations, until it 
observes a stronger threat point for the 
union members. Union's threats can be 
credible when the alternative opportunities 
are available , not when they are expected 
to be available at some future date."
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3.5.2. The equation to be estimated.
In order to derive analytically the real wage function, we 
simplify further the problem and assume that the union maximizes 
the sum of the surpluses gained from an employment condition of 
its members, that is:
(5) max U = L (w/p - w) + (M-L)[(OR b + (1-DR) w*) - w]
Cl/P °
subject to the labour demand (1) and to cl/p * w(l+t)/p. 
Since we look for a solution for cl/p we rewrite (5) as:
(6) max U = L + (M-L)[(UR b + (1-OR) w*) - w]„ . p * wedgecl/p
where wedge= pc (l+t)/p.
The first order condition is:
1 cl a dL(7) L -- ±---  + [---- ----- UR b - (1-UR) w ] .=0wedge p»wedge d(cl/p)
which rewritten becomes:
(8)  — ---- UR b - (1-UR) wa= - L lT7^T7"J 1 1p.wedge d(cl/p) wedge
Dividing both sides by ---— — •p*wedge




(10) OR b + (1-OR) wa =( ie: + L> ----Lw P* wedge
where eLw is the wage elasticity of demand for labour and
(10) is the typical equilibrium condition for a monopoly 
regime. It says that the marginal (utility of) revenue from 
employment must be’ equal to the expected (utility) from the
degree of monopoly power of the union, since the lower the 
employment response of the firm to a change in wages the higher 
the union's pressure on wages.
Osing this simplified solution we can finally write our general 
function for the cost of labour in the form of:
outside opportunities open to the worker. l/e_ measures theLw
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We have already discussed the expected sign of the relation 
between cl/p and all these variables in the preceding section 
[23].
As for the effect of eLw on cl/p, some comments are in order.
Making use of the Slutsky equation and decomposing the factor
demand components into the output and substitution effects, we can
rewrite e, as:Lw
(12) e. = v. (e + Or )Lw L pq T jW
where v is the share of labour in the total cost of production L * • .
and aLw is the Allen own elasticity of substitution [24].
<r is defined as:Lw
(13) aLw* SLw 7 VL
where e£w i-s the output constant wage elasticity of demand for 
labour.
Therefore (12) becomes [25]:
(14) e, = v„ e + eiLw L pq Lw
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What we want to explore is the effect of aggregate demand 
changes on the real wage through eLw . Let's assume, consistently
with our section on production theory, that the price elasticity 
of demand for output is a positive function of the business cycle.
expansions the firm's monopoly power in the product market 
increases.
Therefore:
We have seen, moreover, that if there is imperfect competition 
in the product market and (15) holds, the demand for labour is a 
positive function of aggregate demand changes in such a way that, 
coeteris paribus, during an expansion the labour share in total 
production cost will increase. That is:
which we proxy by B= ( pF/p, REXP ). That means that during
(15)
+(16)




The wage elasticity of labour demand depends on B if the two 
components of (17) are not offsetting.
If they are offsetting, e^w is constant and the real wage will
be rigid over the business cycle; fluctuations will fall entirely
on employment. In all other cases, we can only write:
r 7 7(18) eLw- eLw( p / p, REXP )
where the direction of change is indeterminate.
In this light, we may rewrite (11) as:
1 + + + F? 7(19) = h ( UR, b, wedge, wS , p /p, REXP)
So the monopoly wage may move either procyclically or
countercyclically ( if e_ is variable) thus dampening orLw
magnifying the procyclical fluctuations in employment. If e^w is
constant, instead, we have an explanation of the wage rigidity 
over the business cycle.
The business cycle, in our model, will be proxied in both 
sectors by total real expenditure and by competitiveness in the 
sector exposed to international competition. The other element of 
openness of the model is to be found in the wedge, which, as we
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showed in section 3.3. accounts for the pressure exerted on the 
consumption wage of both sectors by changes in the relative price 
of imports.
In our specification we do not impose any structure on the form 
of the utility function, so that our problem is to maximize:
(20) 0 * U ( UR,L,w,wa ,wedge,b,cl/p)
with respect to cl/p, subject to labour demand (1).
From the f.o.c. we derive the final specification:
(21) cl/p= f(UR, .K, pm/p, w, wa , wedge, b, B)
Comparing this result with that we derived for the competitive 
model of section 3.2., we observe that the crucial difference is 
given by the unemployment rate which does not appear in that 
specification. All the remaining variables have the same 
interpretation as in the competitive model, had we assumed there 
the same demand for labour as here.
The role of the capital labour ratio which does not appear
here, is taken up by w which is the subsistence reference wage and 




Let's assume that the bargaining set B, that is the set of 
pairs of firm's and union's utilities ( v and u respectively), is 
closed, bounded and convex.
Let's represent it in the v,u plane [26].
Suppose that the point (u*,v*)€ B is the payoff of the union
and firm when no bargaining takes place. Of course, the firm would
rather obtain v and the union u , but these two wishes are max max
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incompatible. Any bargaining point in the shaded area, however, 
would be preferred by both to the point (u*,v*) and considered a 
fair outcome.
Nash shows that if we displace the origins of the axis so that 
(u*,v*)€ B— (0,0) 6 B' and chose (Uq »Vq ) in such a way that:
*) (u ’' )S B' and u', v* > 0:o o o o
b ) U!VJL> uv for a11 (u»v) 6 B*, o o— ' '
then the point (u^, v^ ) is the solution to the bargaining game in 
B*.
Since u'* u - u*, and v'= » - v* where (v , u )? B we get that:O O o o o o
(Al) (UQ- U*)(VQ- v*)>(u - U*)(V - V*)
for all u,v e B and such that u> u*, v> v*.
This functional form is the only one which satisfies the
following four axioms required for a bargaining solution:
1) invariance w.r.t. utility transformations;
2) Pareto optimality;
3) independence of irrelevant alternatives;
4) symmetry [27].
There are many objections to the axioms that underly the Nash 
solution but, as far as we know, solutions based on more 
satisfactory axioms have led to complicated arithmetic solutions 
and messy comparative static results (Kalai and Smorodinsky,1975).
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Footnotes
1 This fact has been well documented for the U.S. by R. J. Gordon 
(1970,1971,1977).
2 This result is obtained from the maximization of an 
individual's two-period utility function of consumption and 
leisure subject to his two-period budget constraint.
3 Until recently, econometricians have not paid much attention to 
the intertemporal substitution hypothesis despite its 
theoretical importance. Solow (1980, p.7) literally attacks its 
believers:
"It is astonishing that believers have 
made substantially no effort to verify this 
central hypothesis. I know of no convincing 
evidence in its favour, and I am not sure 
why it has any claim to be taken seriously."
Altonji (1982) provides a careful investigation of whether 
the intertemporal substitution model can explain the annual 
time series data for the U.S. Sis results, and much other 
evidence he cites, raise serious doubts about the empirical 
viability of the intertemporal substitution-market equilibrium 
view of the labour market. Ashenfelter and Card(1982) estimate 
a simplified model with intertemporal substitution but their 
results as well confirm the incapability of this assumption to 
explain the U.S. labour market in the years 1956:1-1980:1. 
Andrews and Nickell (1982) estimate a competitive model for the 
U.K.(1948-1979) and contrast its results with those of a non­
competitive one. They draw the conclusion that the competitive 
model does not fit the facts.
4 The theory of implicit contracts must be included among the 
present most popular theories of the labour market. See the 
seminal papers by Azariadis (1975) and Hart (1983).
5 For an excellent survey of this literature see Yellen (1984).
6 See e.g. Calvo(1979), Salop (1979), Stiglitz (1974).
7 The efficiency wage hypothesis, anyway, might prove to be 
useful for explaining other important components of the 
determination of wages such as, for example, the wage drift.
121
8 We use an extremely simplified version of the labour demand 
function since we have already thoroughly treated its 
specification in chapter 2,
9 Since:
(1) u= (LP- Ii)/LP
then:
(2) - ln(l-u) * In LP- In L 
Linearizig (2) around u=0 we get that :
(3) u = - ln(l-u) 
from which we get the result.
10 See the majority of Oswald's papers, and in particular Oswald 
(1979, 1982, 1985)
11 See the survey papers by Farber (1985) and Pencavel (1985).
12 There is a vast literature concerning the choice of the union's 
utility function. In recent cdntributions to this issue two 
main streams may be identified :
1) studies that make use of an expected utility or utilitarian 
function (e.g. McDonald and Solow, 1981);
2) studies which assume a specific structural form to replace 
the general quasi-concave utility function (e.g. Pencavel, 
1984a,b who chooses a Stone-Geary utility function).
See on this point Oswald (1985).
13 The isoprofit curves are given by the implicit derivation of
(11):
(11a) dw/dL = [R*(L) - w]/L
Their maxima are given equating (11a) to zero so that:
(lib) R'(L) = w
which is the labour demand equation.
14 Sutton (1985) shows how any Nash equilibrium of a wide range of 
non-cooperative games will, in the limit, coincide with the 
Nash bargaining solution.
15 The idea that the union and the firm are better off above and 
to the right of the labour demand curve is originally due to 
Leontief (1946)
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16 See for the British economy e.g. Oswald and Turnbull (1985) for
evidence against this hypothesis, and Daniel and Millward
(1983) for evidence in favour.
17 See e.g. Carruth and Oswald (1985), who focus on .the British
post war coal sector and the role of the National Onion of Mine
workers; MaCurdy and Pencavel (1985) focus on data on U.S. 
typographical unions.
18 See e.g. Modigliani and Tarantelli (1977) and Sylos Labini
(1977).
19 Note the difference with Anglo-Saxon countries where most of 
the unions are closed shops.
20 We believe that M does not directly depend on union behaviour. 
The decision to register at the employment agency is influenced 
by other, even sociological, factors which we may assume to be 
exogenous to our analysis. Nonetheless, we prefer the 
specification where M does not appear for the trivial reason 
that there are difficulties in finding data for this variable.
21 .To be precise, in the E.F.O. Scandinavian two-sector model it 
is assumed that there is only one union which determines a 
unique wage level for both sectors. The institutional framework 
of the Italian labour market is characterized by a lower degree 
of centralized bargaining than the Scandinavian countries and 
this allows us to assume the existence of two sectoral wages.
4 ^
22 Although we are deriving a relation between the level of the 
real wage and unemployment it is easy to show that this is 
easily transformable into a relation between money wage changes 
and the unemployment rate (cfr. Nickell, 1984, p.33).
23 For the derivation from a specific utility function of the 
effects of changes in benefits, membership income and 
employment subsidies on the monopoly wage see Oswald (1982).
24 For this derivation see e.g. Layard and Walters (1978) ch.9 
appendix 8.
25 This is the general case for more than two factors of 
production. In the two-factor constant returns to scale case
(12) reduces to :
er * vr e - (1- v.) s. _Lw L pq L LK
where s. is the elasticity of substitution between labour and LK
capital.
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26 This short exposition of Nash*s solution follows Luce and 
Raiffa (1957), pp.124-28.
27 See assumptions on p.126-7 and proof of unicity p. 128 by Luce 
and Raiffa (1957).
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CHAPTER 4 THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
4.1. The econometric model; specification strategy and the 
specification of the equations.
We now come to the presentation of the econometric 
specification of the theoretical model of firms' and unions’ 
behaviour derived in the preceding chapters.
It is a two-sector quarterly econometric model of the labour 
market and the accumulation process in Italy for the period 1970- 
1984. The two sectors are industry in the strict sense, which we 
call sector 1, and services plus the construction industry, which 
we call sector 2 [1]. They can also be regarded loosely as the
sector which is exposed to and sheltered from international 
competition respectively.
The theoretical model presented in ch.2 and ch.3 has primarily 
the aim of identifying the determinants of employment, investment, 
prices and wages under a specific set of hypotheses. This being 
our main target, we have not specified any functional form for the 
technology of production or the demand for goods. As for 
expectations, we have assumed them to be rational and invoked 
Sargent's technique together with some simplifying assumptions.
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We are not in a position» therefore# to impose any restriction 
derived from the assumptions on the form of technology or 
expectations and we simply estimate reduced form equations.
4.1.1. The specification strategy
Our model consists of a system of four simultaneous equations 
for each sector: employment, investment, prices and wages.
The specification search was carried out at the single equation 
level by means of instrumental variables. We started from a very 
general specification, estimating initially fourth-order 
autoregressive equations and then "testing down" to more 
parsimonious specifications. We have then proceeded to take into 
account the cross-equation correlation reestimating, the whole 
model by Three Stage Least Squares (see Appendix III). To this 
end, we have simply imposed the cross-equation restrictions.
As far as the specification tests are concerned, we did not 
merely rely on t ratios of the individual coefficients , Durbin 
Watson and Durbin-h statistics. More sophisticated tools are 
needed when dealing with simultaneous equation systems: we
concentrated mainly on three major characteristics an estimated 
equation might show and that are all connected to the problem of 
misspecification. They are: serial correlation, predictive failure 
and correlation of instruments with the residuals [2]. The method 
we have followed is based on the analysis of estimated residuals 
by means of auxiliary regressions.
129
Serial correlation.
Durbin Watson and Durbin—h statistics detect only first-order 
serial correlation, and, as Godfrey (1978) has shown, they are not 
valid even for that when simultaneous equations systems are being 
estimated. We have therefore followed the method developed by 
Godfrey (1976) and Breusch and Godfrey (1981) for testing for 
serial correlation in dynamic simultaneous equations models. In 
our case the test was built to detect serial correlation of the
4tb order, which is one of the most informative when using 
quarterly data. Note, however, that this test, cannot discriminate 
between autoregression and moving-average hypothesis.
Predictive failure.
If an estimated equation exhibits poor goodness of fit for 
predicted values, there might be two major problems: either there 
is a structural break (that is, the coefficients change) over the 
period considered, or the equation is misspecified. In order to 
take into account this problem we have tested each specification 
by means of a Chow test (Davidson,1984).
Instruments validity.
The two properties a suitable set of instruments must have are 
that they should be highly correlated with the explanatory 
variables and uncorrelated with the disturbance terms, in order to 
ensure consistency of the I.V. estimator.
130
As far as the first property is concerned, we have run 
auxiliary single variable A.R. or multivariate regressions for the 
endogenous variables which were not explained in our system of 
equations. Once a set of instruments was found, we have proceeded 
to test for their validity, regressing the estimated residuals on 
them (Sargan, 1964).
We present, in what follows, all these results.
For each equation we derive the long-run coefficients of the 
long-run solution which corresponds to the theoretical model in 
its static form. We also discuss the dynamics of adjustment to the 
steady-state solution.
4.1.2. The specification of the equations.
In this section we set out our empirical versions of the 
equations of labour demand, investment, prices and wages.
Table 1 lists the symbols used and table 2 lists the
descriptive and test statistics reported with each estimated
equation.
The test on the form of adjustment costs of capital was carried 
out including investment between the explanatory variables of 
labour demand. When its coefficient turned out to be significant 
we did not reject the hypothesis of non-separable adjustment 
costs.
In sector 1 we have imposed, after testing, long-run constant 




[The subscript i=l,2 refers to sector 1
(industry in the strict sense) and sector 2
(private services + construction industry).]
L^: number of employees;
K.,: capital stock;
1^: gross investment;
cl^j cost of labour per employee (inclusive of employers'
contributions, tl); 
w^: gross earnings per employee i.e. cl= w (l+t2);
p^: value added deflator;
01p : index of prices of imported raw materials in liras (index in
dollars multiplied by the exchange rate liras per dollar);
Pp : index of prices of imported competing goods in liras (index
in dollars multiplied by the exchange rate);
fcftt+^real interest rate expedted next period. It is the difference
between the rate of interest on bank loans and next period 
expected rate of inflation of the sectoral value added 
deflator;
p^: deflator of investment in machinery;
ER: domestic exchange rate (liras per dollar);
Pc : households consumption deflator;
tl^: taxation rate on employers;
t2^: direct taxation rate on labour income;
U : unemployment rate net of workers in the wage supplementation 
fund (C.I.G.);
AW1,AW2 : alternative wage for sector 2 and sector 1
respectively. Defined as the real gross earnings per employee 
in sector 1 and 2, that is gross earnings over the consumption 
deflator;
REXP: real final expenditure.
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List of











descriptive and test statistics
: standard error of regression;
: mean of dependent variable;
: corrected R2 .
: Ourbin Watson.
: number of observations.
: Sargan criterion for independence of • errors of
instrumental variables in the sample period. 
The x in parenthesis is the number of instruments minus 
the number of regressors.
: Godfrey criterion for serial correlation. In parenthesis 
is the order of the correlation.
: Chow criterion for predictive failure. In parenthesis is 
the number of predicted quarters.
: Lagrange Multiplier test for serial .correlation; p is 
the order of the correlation.
: Chow test for predictive failure; y is the no. of 
predicted quarters.
The numbers in parenthesis beside the coefficients are t 
statistics.
hypothesis of internal adjustment costs for capital (see sect.
4.2.).
The log-linear specification for the demand for labour in 
sector 1 is therefore the following (we omit the subscript 1 for 
simplicity) :
n
(1 ) ln(L/K)t= aQ+ a1ln(L/K)t_1+ ^  a2 .ln(I/K)t_. +
n
ifo =3 i1»«=l/P)t_i+ a41ln (p’/plj.j*
" h 
i-o a5 iln(i>2 W  t io  a6 i (f,F/E,)t - i *
n n
.2 a_.InREXP .+ a_.Re .1=0 7i t-i i=o 8i t-i
133
and the specification for investment is :
n
( 2 )  i n  (I/K)t= b0* 4  b j . l n ^ / p ) ^ , *
n
J o  »31ln(cl/p)t..*...
and all the other explanatory variables of the labour demand (1).
The log-linear specification for labour demand in sector 2 is 
(we omit the subscript 2 for simplicity):
n
(3) in Lt= co* ^ln I*t_1+ ¡f0 c21ln(cl/p)t..t
n n
i-o C3iln C4lln(E,l /p >t-l+
n n
£ Z _e/  e.InREXP. .+ c R i=o 5i t**i i-o 6i t i
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and the specification for investment is:
Z(4) In I * d + d In I + d ln{D /d) +1 1 t 0 1 t-1 i=o 2i I t— i
n
1=0
and all the other explanatory variables of the labour demand (3).
The crucial difference between (1) and (3) is the presence in 
(1) of current investment as explanatory variable of current 
labour demand. The test for this sector led us to reject the 
hypothesis of internal adjustment costs for capital. Demand is 
represented by real expenditure only, since we assume that sector
2 is sheltered from foreign competition (which we have proxied by
P ^ ) «  • •
The specification for the price equation is the following:
(5) In p/clt= eQ+ ex In P/clt_1+ i=0e2iln pm/clt-i+
n n
2 e In pF/cl. .+ .2 e In K . i=o 3i * t-i i=o 4i t-i
where the reparameterization into p/cl comes from the theory [4].
The specification for the real cost of labour is the 
following:
n
(6) In cl/pt- fQ+ fxln cl/pt_1+ ¿ 0*2iln wed9et-i+
n  n
}  f In AW2t .+ f . In .+ i=o 3 i t-i i=0 41 t-i
(5) and (6) are for sector 1. For sector 2 we adopt the same 
specifications except .we do not have competitiveness between the 
explanatory variables and have AW1 in the equation for the cost of 
labour.
The dynamics of our model is, therefore, ad hoc. We can justify 
the introduction of the lagged dependent and independent variables 
invoking Sargent's technique (1978, 1979) and the fact that we are 
estimating reduced forms only. We note, however, that estimation 
of structural equations based on particular untested functional 
forms is an equally ad hoc procedure (5].
Equations 1-6 represent the general specification we have 
tested for our stochastic difference equations, before "testing 
down" to obtain the restricted and more robust specifications that 
we proceed to present in the following subsections.
4.1.3. Definition of the expected real interest rate.
As we have previously seen, the presence of adjustment costs 
involves the term (see sect.2.2.1.):
(tPt+i/pt)/ll/(1+rt)] = 1/(1V W ’
This term appears between the explanatory variables of labour 
demand where:
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tV i ’ rt ’ ' A « '  ft)/rt
and is the nominai interest rate.
We have defined it as:
R = r — H  t t+1 t t t+1
[6] and we have used in the regression the following variable:
Rt+1 = tRt+l+ *t+l
where R , is the true value, R , is the observed value and e^ , t t+1 t+1 t+1
is the error of measurement.
We have thus estimated the following regression equat-ion:
L = a + b R . + c Z + u = a + b R  + c Z  - b e  + u  = t t t+1 t t t+1 t t+1 t
= a + b R L „ + c Z  + vt+1 t t+1
where Zfc represents all the other regressors. Hence:
v = u - b e t+1 t t+1
We have thus an example of the situation when the dependent 
variable is measured with error. Even if:
E(ufc)= E(et+1)= E(vt+l)-0
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the Ordinary Least Squares technique yields inconsistent estimates 
of the coefficient of the wrongly measured independent variable.
We have overcome this problem assuming rational expectations 
and using the Instrumental Variables estimation technique [71. As 
McCallum (1976) has shown, this approach exploits the fact that, 
under rational expectations, realized variables equal their 
conditional expectations plus a forecast error orthogonal to all 
variables in the conditioning set. This approach, however, leads 
to inefficient parameter estimates since, in general, v^+^ is
serially correlated as Hayashi (1980) has noted. In order to 
overcome this drawback Cumby, Huizinga and Obstfeld (1983) have 
developed a two-step estimator which is applicable when equation's 
residuals are autocorrelated.
* As we are going to show, we did not incur this problem, since 
we have not detected serial correlation of the residuals in our 
employment equation.
4.2. Econometric results: labour demand equation.
4.2.1. The exposed sector: industry in the strict sense.
We start with the employment equation of sector 1 whose 
estimated specification is reported in table 3.
It is important to stress again that the employment series we 
use for our regressions is the number of dependent workers net of 
the employees who are in the wage supplementation fund (C.I.G.).
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These workers are kept idle but are still considered as 
employees in the ISTAT (Italian National Institute of Statistics) 
employment series. We have used, instead, the employment series 
supplied by the Bank of Italy, which, after estimating the number 
of workers subject to the C.I.6., gives the net series.
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Table 3
LABOUR DEMAND EQUATION, QUARTERLY, 1971(I)-1984(IV)
Sector 1


































*Flog (I/K) t_x , log E R ^ *  log pfc ,
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The adjustment process Is a transformation of the specification 
presented in section 2.2.1., where we had only one lagged 
dependent variable. It can easily be derived as follows.
Assume a simple demand for labour equation of the form:
(1) L * a^ + a, In L, + a_w a ,a.> 0 , a,<0t o  1 t—1 2 t O l  2
Subtracting b ^from both sides and substituting with
eq.(l) we get:
(2) V  dQ ♦ dxLt.1+ d2Lt.2+ d3wt+ d4wt_1
where: d = (l-b)a -, d,® a+.b, d = -ba, , d = a_, d = - ba„.o 0 . 1 1  2 . 1 3 2 4  2
The equation was estimated on quarterly data for the period
1971-1984.
All the variables are in natural logarithms except the expected 
real interest rate [8] so that the coefficients are elasticities. 
The coefficient on tRt+1 can be interpreted as the elasticity
of employment with respect to (1+tRt+1) since tRt+1= ln(1+tRt+l*‘
The equation performs rather well. We reject both the null 
hypothesis of serial correlation and of instrument correlation 
with the residuals.
The Chow test, instead, is between the 2.5% and 1% thresholds. 
This outcome was, in a way, expected since a simple look at the 
series for industrial employment reveals a conspicuous turning
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point approximately in correspondence with the second quarter of 
1981 (see sect.1.3.). Up to that point the series exhibits 
fluctuations around a nearly flat trend; from that point on the 
trend is strongly negative and the cyclical fluctuations 
disappear. Since the value of the Chow test is not so strongly 
against the specification and the period for which a different set 
of coefficients would be appropriate is quite short, we do not 
reject the equation. We take into account for further research, 
however, that around 1981 there is a structural break.
Turning now to the coefficients themselves we note that they 
are all significant at the 97.5% confidence interval.
The coefficients on the relative price of sector 1 and on real 
expenditure were not significant and we have estimated the 
equation excluding • these two explanatory variables. The real 
expenditure variable might have introduced serious 
multicollinearity problems given its high correlation with the 
cost of labour variable. Both of them, in fact, are highly 
trended.
The lagged employment coefficients indicate a fairly slow 
response to changes in all the independent explanatory variables.
Employment reacts to a change in the cost of labour after one 
year (the short-run elasticity is -.067) and it takes on average 6 
years for a change in cl/p to be transmitted to employment (the 
mean lag is approximately 24 quarters).
The adjustment process with respect to the other independent 
variables has more or less the same speed (the shorter mean lag is 
that of competitiveness with 20 quarters).
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The long-run elasticities of the independent variables are given 
in table 4 below. Wald’s test for the restriction on the long-run 
coefficient of the capital stock is given in parenthesis [9J.
The conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that 
employment is more than proportionately responsive to changes in 
its explanatory variables, but the speed of adjustment is slow.
Our specification contains some standard and some new elements 
when compared with the employment equations available in other 
studies on the Italian labour market that we shall see later.
We have already justified theoretically all the included 
variables and we proceed now to give them an economic
interpretation in the Italian economic context.
The standard explanatory variables are the cost of labour and 
the price -of imported raw materials. The empirical analysis leads 
not to reject the assumption that producers in the industry sector 
have been on their labour demand curve and that there is
complementarity between the inputs of labour and the inputs of
imported raw materials.
This is in line with the results obtained by Heimler and Milana
(1984) with a completely different approach, that is an input- 
output analysis of the demand of productive factors in Italian
industry for the period 1956-1982. One of their findings is that 
after the 1973 increase in the relative prices of raw materials 
with respect to the intermediate inputs, the Italian producers 
were led
"... to a vertical disintegration of the 
productive processes, causing an increase in
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the demand for intermediate labour-
incorporating inputs and a relative decrease 
in the demand for labour itself." (Heimler 
and Milana, p.145).
It is also standard practice to introduce a demand term in the 
labour demand equation, although at a theoretical level its 
inclusion is not so straightforward as we have seen in ch.2 .
The demand effect in our equation is represented by the
coefficient on competitiveness, which is defined as:
F F*p / p = ER* (p / p)
F*where p is the index in dollars of the price of imported 
competing goods. This coefficient measures the employment effects 
of terms of- trade changes . It says that, in the period studied, 
the Italian industrial producers when faced by a one percentage
F*point increase in ER or in p /p or in the sum of their changes,
have increased their demand for labour by .044% in the short-run
and 1.5% in the long-run.
The novelty elements are represented by the introduction of the 
real interest rate and investment in the employment equation.
The coefficients of these two explanatory variables might be 
helpful at giving some insight on the thorny question of the 
employment effect of the accumulation process in the Italian 
industrial sector [10].
The negative coefficient on current investment can be 
interpreted as the effect of technological progress on employment.
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Table 4
LABOUR DEMAND EQUATION, QUARTERLY, 1971(IJ-1984(IV)
Sector 1
Long-run estimated elasticities of employment w.r.t.
a 1% point change of the independent variables.










Note: the number in parenthesis is a Wald test in its t-catio form 
of the unit long-run elasticity of capital restriction.
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The impact on employment of the more technologically advanced new 
vintage of capital has a negative effect on employment [11].
Capital and labour, however, are complementary factors as it is 
implied by the negative coefficient on the real interest rate 
which might be interpreted as a proxy of the cost of capital 
services.
4.2.2. The sheltered sector: services and the construction
industry.
We turn now to the employment equation of sector 2 whose 
specification is given in table 5.
The equation was estimated for the period 1971:1 1984:4.
All the variables are expressed in natural logarithms.
The included variables, that are significant at the 97.5% 
confidence interval are the real cost of labour, real expenditure 
and capital.
The equation passes all the specification tests.
The lagged employment coefficient indicates a fairly rapid 
response to changes in the exogenous variables, but the long-run 
elasticities are considerably lower than the corresponding 
elasticities for sector 1, as is shown in table 6.
The fact that the employment elasticities in this sector are 
lower than in the industry sector is to be expected, given the far 
higher degree of openness of the latter.
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Table 5
LABOUR DEMAND EQUATION, QUARTERLY, 1971(I)-1984(IV)
Sector 2
Independent variables Dependent variable
log Lfc
constant .60 (1.9)
log L .74 (10.4)
log (cl/p)fc_4 -.077 (-2.6)













LABOUR DEMAND EQUATION, QUARTERLY, 1971{I )-1984(IV)
Sector 2
Long-run estimated elasticities of employment w.r.t. 
a 1% point change of the independent variables.









The real expenditure term which represents the pressure of 
demand on employment, is significant and it has a more rapid and 
larger effect than the real cost of labour.
We have assumed that the production function of this sector is 
characterized by adjustment costs in the inputs of labour and 
capital. Our results might be interpreted in the sense that these 
adjustment costs are external for both labour and capital, since 
investment does not turn out to be a significant explanatory 
variable of employment.
Moreover, the raw materials price shock which occurred in 1973 
and 1979 has left the employment level in this sector unaffected.
The problem with this equation is that the real expected 
interest rate is not significant in this sector. This seems in 
contrast with the assumption of the existence of adjustment costs- 
in labour input. As we have just seen, we have a justification 
for the exclusion of investment from this labour demand equation. 
This explanation is based on inferences that we can draw on the 
kind of technology adopted by the firms in sector 2. We do not 
have, instead, an economic explanation for the non significance of 
the expected real interest rate. The only explanation we can 
attempt is that the chosen definition of tHt+1 is aot relevant
for the demand for labour in this sector. It might be the case, 
for example, that the relevant interest rate is a long-term rate. 
Given the difficulty of finding a good measure for the real 
expected interest rate relevant for this sector, we prefer to 
leave this issue unsettled at this stage.
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4.2.3. Other studies on employment in the Italian economy.
As far as we know, only one other model of the Italian economy 
exists which distinguishes between the sheltered and the exposed 
sector ( Zandano et al.,1982). It is estimated on quarterly data 
over the period 1968:1 1976:4 and it is based on theoretical
foundations which differ from ours, so that any comparison is 
impossible [12].
The majority of the existing models estimate employment
equations for the whole economy or for the manufacturing sector
only.
Modigliani, Padoa Schioppa and Rossi (1986), in their model on 
unemployment in Italy, estimate an aggregate employment equation 
on -annual data for the period 1960-1983-. Their equation as well 
differs strongly from ours. We noté, however, that their long-run 
elasticity of the cost of labour with respect to employment is
-.346 (and the mean lag is 5.1 years). This value is slightly
higher than the value we have estimated for the sheltered sector.
The discrepancy with the elasticity we obtained for the 
industry sector is to be expected, s'ince Modigliani’s equation 
explains aggregate dependent and independent employment, whereas, 
ours explains only dependent employment in industry. The need of 
disaggregated studies on such important issues as employment 
finds, therefore, a further confirmation.
The result by Modigliani is confirmed also in two other studies 
that present an aggregate employment equation for Italy based on 
O.E.C.D. yearly data (Bean, Layard and Nickell, 1986; Newell and
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Symons,1985). They report a long-run employment elasticity with 
respect to the real cost of labour of -.37 (1953-1983) and -.37 
(1963-1981) respectively.
M. Bruno (1985) estimates an employment equation for the 
Italian manufacturing industry for the period 1965-1982. The 
employment elasticity with respect to the real cost of labour is 
-1.01. This result is nearer to ours, but it still differs 
substantially, presumably because of the different sample period 
and specification of the equation.
4.3. Econometric results : the investment equation.
4.3.1. The exposed sector.
We present in table 7 the investment equation for sector 1.
The dependent variable is (I/K)^, that is real gross investment
over the capital stock, since we have imposed constant returns to 
scale in this sector (see sect. 4.1.2.).
All the variables are. in natural logarithms.
The equation was estimated for the period 1971:2 1984:4.
It passes all the specification tests.
The coefficient on the real cost of labour and the investment 
deflator [13] are fully significant, whereas the coefficients on 
the real interest rate and the change in real expenditure are 
significant at the 95% confidence interval.
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Table 7
INVESTMENT EQUATION, QUARTERLY, 1971(II)-1984(IV)
Sector 1
Independent variables Dependent variable
log (I/K)t
constant 






























log (PI/P)t_2 ' 1°9 (Pj/P)t_3»
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The lagged investment coefficients indicate a faicly rapid 
response to changes in all the independent explanatory variables.
Table 8 reports the long-run elasticities.
Looking at the size of the short-run coefficients it emerges 
that the variables representing profitability have a major role in 
determining the changes in investment. In particular, it turns out 
that the real cost of labour has a relatively small direct role in 
the slowdown of industrial capital accumulation, while changes in 
aggregate demand played a more substantial role in the profit 
squeeze and resulting contraction in investment.
4.3.2. The sheltered sector.
Table 9 reports the estimated investment equation for sector 2 
and table 10 the long-run elasticities.
The dependent variable is real gross investment and the sample 
period is 1971:1 1984:4. All the variables are in natural
logarithms.
The equation passes all the specification tests.
The first thing we note is the absence of the real investment 
deflator. We tested the inclusion of p^/p, but this was
insignificant. This outcome was to be expected since, presumably, 
the investment deflator which is relevant for sector 2 is that of 




INVESTMENT EQUATION, QUARTERLY, 1971(II)-1984(IV)
Sector 1
Long-run estimated elasticities of investment w.r.t. 
a 1% point change of the independent variables.







INVESTMENT EQUATION, QUARTERLY, 1971(I)-1984(IV) 
Sector 2






log (cl/p)t_3 -.38 (-2.8)
log (1+Re )fc_1 -.29 (-1.7)
D2log REXPfc 1.54 (1.8)

















Instruments: log , D2log REXP .
Table 10
INVESTMENT EQUATION, QUARTERLY, 1971(I )-1984(IV)
Sector 2
Long-run estimated elasticities of investment w.r.t. 
a 1% point change of the independent variables.







As for the other variables, we observe the significative role 
of real expenditure changes and of the real cost of labour as 
determinants of real gross investment.
4.3.3. Other studies on investment in the Italian economy.
We can compare our results with those by Faini and 
Schiantarelli (1984) who follow an approach which is very similar 
to ours.
They estimate the investment equation for the industrial sector 
in the period 1969-1980. They constrain the long-run elasticity on 
the price of investment and nominal wages to be the same (that is 
they use the Pj/w ratio as regressor and estimate a long-run
elasticity of -.4). This results is therefore in contrast with 
ours, since we estimate a negative coefficient for the real cost 
of labour. Their long-run elasticity on the expected real interest 
rate, which they define as the nominal interest rate minus the 
rate of expected wage inflation, is negative and higher than 
ours (-1.7). No demand variables appear in their equation, but 
they claim that this effect is caught by the expected rate of 
growth in production over the next quarter.
In another recent study by the Bank of Italy, (Magnani and 
Valcaraonici, 1984) the authors estimate an accelerator model and a 
profit-maximizing model of aggregate investment in Italy 
(excluding constructions) for the period 1970:1 1982:4. Their 
results show that a "pure" accelerator model with distributed
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changes in value added as explanatory variables is not sufficient 
to explain the Italian accumulation process and has a limited 
forecasting capacity. The introduction of the expected real 
interest rate improves the equation considerably and the authors 
cannot reject the hypothesis of a profit-maximizing model of 
investment fitting the Italian case [14].
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any study on investment in 
the service sector that could allow a comparison with the results 
obtained fot the sheltered sector.
4.4. Econometric results: the price equation.
4.4.1. The exposed sector.
The price equation for sector 1 was estimated over the period 
1971:1 1984:4.
The results are reported in table 11.
It is a very simple equation. It performs well, passing all 
the tests for serial correlation and parameter stability.
The coefficients are all significant at the 95% confidence 
interval.
The estimated price equation reflects the assumed pricing rule 
we have discussed in chapter 2, according to which prices are 
determined with a mark-up over unit costs.
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Table 11
PRICE EQUATION, QUARTERLY, 1971(I)-1984(IV)
Sector 1
Independent variables Dependent variable
log (p/cl)t
constant 11.7 (4.8)
log (p/cl)t_4 .256 (2.1)
log (pm/cl)t_4 .14 (3.5)
log K -.84 (4.8)
S.E.R. .036
M.O.D.V. 4.78





Chow test(8), F(8,52) .27
pm/cl elasticity (long-run) .2
K elasticity (long-run) -1
Notes: There are no current endogenous variables on the right,'so 
estimation is by OLS.
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Strictly speaking, since we are explaining the industrial value 
added deflator, we should not have included in the equation the 
index of prices of imported raw materials. Nonetheless, we have 
put it between the explanatory variables, in order to take into 
account the degree and velocity of adjustment of domestic prices 
to international prices of raw materials (which in the 70's have 
represented the major component of international inflation). Its 
long-run elasticity is, in fact, quite low, but fully significant
and the adjustment is completed in 1-j years.
We did not find any effect of the demand variables, real 
expenditure or competitiveness, on industrial prices.
The empirical results suggest that the Italian industrial 
entrepreneurs apply a. demand invariant mark-up over, unit costs. 
The constancy of the mark-up is implied, at a theoretical level, 
by the assumption that the price elasticity of demand depends on
Fthe determinants of demand (p , REXP) (cfr. sect. 2.1.). This 
price equation is therefore consistent with the specification of 
industrial labour demand where competitiveness appears as a 
significant explanatory variable.
This equation does not show any element of novelty as far as 
its specification is concerned, and is consistent with the 
evidence supplied by other studies on industrial pricing in Italy
[15].
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4.4.2. The sheltered sector.
The price equation for sector 2 was estimated for the period 
1971:1 1984:4. The results are reported in table 12. It passes all 
the specification tests.
It must be noted, first of all, that we have estimated an
equation for the quarterly rate of change of p/cl. The coefficient 
on (p/cl)t_1 is in fact approximately equal to one. We also find
an influence of the rate of acceleration of sectoral price 
inlation, which, in the long-run, can be assumed to be equal to 
zero.
As far as the coefficient on the price of imported raw
materials is concerned, the same observation as for sector 1 
applies, except that here the coefficient is even smaller.
We find in this sector a small influence on prices of real
expenditure. This is consistent with the theory since we have not
ruled out a priori the dependence of the mark-up on demand 
variables.
Note that the capital stock is not present in the equation as 
it should be. Complications might have arisen because of the high 
degree of correlation between the real expenditure variable and 
the capital stock.
Table 12
PRICE EQUATION, QUARTERLY, 1971(IJ-1984(IV)
Sector 2
Independent variables Dependent variable
log (p/cl)
constant -1.3 (-1.67)
log (p/cl)t l 1.02 (22.3)
log (pm/cl)t_4 .04 (2.37)
log REXPt_1 .1 (1.99)
DD log pt .443 (5.16)






GC( 4 ) .8
CC( 8 ) 5
Instruments: log Pt_^/ 1°9 Pt_2*
1 6 1
4*5. Econometric results : the cost of labour equation.
4.5.1. The exposed sector.
The real cost of labour was estimated for the period 1971:1
1984:4. All the variables are in natural logarithms. As can be
seen in table 13 all the coefficients are highly significant.
Since no lagged dependent term appears on the left hand side,
the coefficients are to be interpreted as long-run elasticities.
As we have' explained in sect. 3.3.,. the coefficient on
tp_(l+tl)/p] measures the effect on the cost of labour of the c
discrepancy between the product and the consumption wage. The 
higher p^(1+11 ) (the lower p) the higher (the lower) the pressure
on the real cost of labour. In sector 1, this effect is nearly 
one, reflecting the high level of wage indexation which has 
characterized the Italian industry in the period under study.
The high coefficient on the alternative wage (real gross 
earnings in sector 2) might be interpreted as reflecting a high 
degree of union strength in sector 1. In other words, an increase 
of 1% in the real gross earnings of sector 2 is efficaciously used 
by the union as a threat to induce employers to raise wages in 
sector 1 by .7%.
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Table 13
COST OF LABOUR .EQUATION, QUARTERLY, 1971(I)-1984(IV)
Sector 1
Independent variables Dependent variable
lög (cl/p)t
constant .49 (2.2)
log [pc (l+tl)/p]fc .86 (6.5)
log AW2fc_1 .73 (5.7)
log .13 (3.2)
Din Ufc -.23 (-1.9)
time .003 (3.5)








Instruments: log Pt_^» !°g Pt_2 'i°g Pt_4 ' log
109 üt-l'log at-2'l0g Ut-3'log °t-4' 
log [pc (l+tl)/p]t_1,log [pc (l+tl)/p]t_2 .
The coefficient on competitiveness conveys the effect on wages 
of labour demand shifts due to changes in aggregate demand. This 
coefficient is quite small, as it is reasonable to expect, since 
firms do not usually allow short-run demand fluctuations to 
influence longer term wage agreements.
Industrial wages, therefore, are influenced by the degree of 
openness of the economy through two channels: the effect on
consumption wage of changes in the price of imported consumption 
goods and the effect on demand for labour of changes in 
competitiveness.
As far as the unemployment rate is concerned, its level, or 
the logarithm of it, were found to be insignificant [16]. The 
change in the unemployment rate, however, is significant at the 
95% confidence interval.
Our interpretation of this result is tentative and relies on 
the distinction of unionized members between insiders (employed 
union's members) and outsiders (unemployed union's members) [17].
Suppose the union is split between insiders who have the 
power to choose the policy of the union in the form of wage 
requests, and outsiders. Suppose, moreover, that the insiders 
have acquired some firm (or industry) specific skills required by 
the employers and do not regard the outsiders as potential 
competitors.
In this scenario, the wage requests of the "insiders' " union 
will not be damped by the number of unemployed workers, that is, 
by the current state of the labour market. What will worry the 
union mostly, instead, will be the change in the number of
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unemployed, which the employed worker will regard as a market 
indicator of a potential change in his current state.
We think that this could be a reasonable interpretation of 
what has been happening in the Italian industrial sector, which 
has been characterized, especially from the late '70s onward, by 
a massive and rapidly increasing decline in employment [18].
The coefficient on the change in the unemployment rate is the 
elasticity of the real cost of labour with respect to (1+ DO); 
the term Din 0 can also be interpreted as the change in the 
probability of being employed [19].
We have used a trend to proxy the tendency of the 
productivity of labour which has determined a steady increase in 
the baseline level of wages (cfr. sect.3.5.2.).
When comparing our equation with analogous equations for 
other European countries ( in particular the O.K.), we note the 
absence of unemployment benefits. The Italian institutional 
setting of the labour market is characterized by a 
nearly inexistent unemployment benefit system (cfr. sect.1.4.). 
The wage supplementation fund (C.I.G.) is something
completely different, as we have already seen. It can not be 
considered as a benefit system and even if we did so, our 
benefit variable would be perfectly correlated to the wage, the 
so-called wage supplement being fixed to 80% of the normal pay by 
law.
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4.5.2. The sheltered sector.
The real cost of labour equation was estimated for the period 
1971:1 1984:4 (see table 14).
All the variables are in natural logarithms. Here, as in 
sector 1, the coefficients are to be interpreted as long-run 
elasticities.
The first observation concerns the coefficient of the wedge 
and of the alternative wage (real gross earnings in sector 1): 
they are both lower than the corresponding coefficients of sector
1. This difference might reflect a lower degree of union strength 
in the' sector of services and construction industry. That means, 
for example, that an increase in the industrial real earnings by 
1% induces an increase of .26% only in the real cost of labour of 
the sheltered sector. A higher wage request of the union would 
not represent a credible threat of its employed members' 
quitting the job.
It must be stressed, however, that it is very difficult to 
say a final word on sectoral differentials in earnings. It is 
even more so when we group in the same sector a wide variety of 
activities, as we do here in particular for sector 2.
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Table 14
COST OF LABOUR EQUATION, QUARTERLY, 1971(I)-1984(IV)
Sector 2
Independent variables Dependent variable
log (cl/p)t
constant 1.29 (6.8)
log [pc (l+tl)/p]t .53 (7)
log AWlt .26 (2.2)
Din Ufc -.24 (-3.4)
ln U -.075 (-3)
time .012 (5.6)
time2 -.0001 (5.8)








Instruments: log p ,, log p ., log AW1 , ,t—1 t-4 t-1
log AWlt_2,log AWlfc_3,log AW1 ,
log [p (l+tl)/p] Din U. . . c t-l t-l
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Given these unsolvable difficulties due to the aggregation# 
we may anyway report the observation that in the period 
1970-1978 the Italian industrial sector seems to have gained 
a definite advantage over services« as far as real earnings are 
concerned. From the '80s onwards# in correspondence with the
massive decline in industrial employment, the industrial sector 
looses this advantage and services recover from this weaker
position to regain the lost approximate parity of 1-970 with
the industrial sector [20].
The second difference we note is the fully 
significative coefficient of the logarithm of the unemployment 
rate level (-.075) together with its change (- .24).
Applying the tentative interpretation we used in the .preceding 
subsection, we may infer that the union in this sector is not
only concerned with the increasing rate of unemployment, but also 
with its level. That is because the insiders regard the
unemployed workers as potential competitors to whom the
employers might resort if the union's wage requests are
excessive.
This interpretation might be substantiated by observing
two features of the Italian sheltered sector:
1) this sector includes the majority of the activities that do 
not require specific labour skills;
2) when some skills are required, they are precisely those
supplied in excess of actual demand (this type of excess supply
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is to be found especially among young people with a diploma or 
a university degree).
Since we have taken the logarithm of the unemployment rate, we 
have implicitly assumed that the long-term unemployed exert less 
pressure on wages than the short-term unemployed (see footnote
16). This assumption follows from the observation that the
Italian unions, like other Western countries' unions, seem
to have neglected the weakest components of the labour force
121].
As far as the productivity trend is concerned, the linear 
and quadratic time trends were chosen as most satisfactory in 
terms of goodness of fit and reasonable coefficient estimates.
The demand variable ( i.e. real expenditure here) does not * 
enter significatively the wage equation for this sector, even if 
it appears in the labour demand equation. We are therefore
induced to conclude that wage agreements in this sector are not
influenced at all by cyclical fluctuations in aggregate demand, 
at variance with the exposed sector where we have found a small 
influence on wages of changes in competitiveness.
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Footnotes
1 The public sector and agriculture are exogenous to our 
analysis. In particular, we have excluded the agricultural 
market from the exposed sector, given that, its performance is 
strongly influenced by E.E.C. regulations.
2 As far as the specification tests are concerned, we have 
followed the approach developed by Desai and Weber (1986) and 
Sargan and Weber (1986).
3 We have imposed long-run constant returns to scale in labour 
investment and capital. We use Lucas' production function 
(1967, p.323) where the assumption of homogeneity of degree 
one
"...differs from constant returns to scale in the 
usual sense, since a doubling of capital and
labour and the investment rate will double output, 
but a doubling of capital and labour with a fixed 
investment rate will yield a more than doubled 
output."
4 Since the cost function is homogeneous of degree one in prices
then:
C (w,pm,p,,Y ,K)=  w C ( l,p m/w,p /w,Y,K) y 2 y 2
and expression 7 in sect. 2.1. can be rewritten as follows:
p/w= f(K,Y,pm/w,p2/w)(l- ^) 1 .
5 Sargent (1978) himself recognizes this weakness in the
technique he has devised. He writes:
"It is important to emphasize that this view [ of
a negative relationship between employment and 
real wages] has content (i.e. imposes
overidentifying restrictions) because I have a
priori imposed restrictions on the orders of the
adjustment-costs processes and on the Markov 
process governing disturbances. At a general 
level, without such restrictions, it is doubtful 
whether the equilibrium view has
content."(pp.1041-1042)
6 That is easy to show.
In fact:
»: ■ 1 ‘>t(1+rt 1I/pt + r  1
Then:
ln( R®+ 1)= In [[ pt(!+rt)]/P®+i1 
so that:
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m  (Rt+ 1). Rt, m  [[ Ptd + r t )]/pt+1] * rt-tirt+1 .
7 See on this issue e.g. Pyndick and Rubenfeld (1976) (p.128-
132).
8 It is trivial to note that since R can assume negative values
it can not be transformed in logarithms.
9 We use a Wald test in its t-ratio form. The unrestricted 
equation is:
a) In Lfc * const+ aln blnLt_2+ clnl^t dlnKfc+ all other
regressors.
The restriction we want to test is:
a+b+c+d=l
To do that in the simplest way, we estimate the following 
transformation of a): 
a') lnLfc= const + elnLfc -b (lnL^ - lnLfc )




we test the hypothesis: : e=l.
10 For the description and qualitative evaluation of the
employment-investment relation in Italy in the '60s ‘70s and
'80s see, for example, G. Faustini (1984).
11 The contemporaneity of the demand for labour to new 
investment might be questioned. It has to be noted, however, 
that the wage supplementation fund (C.I.G.) has 
allowed industrial producers, especially in the '80s, to 
have a higher degree of flexibility. The C.I.G. in fact, 
allows to suspend employees from work quite rapidly, 
when the need of restructuration has been ascertained for 
the firm who has asked the C.I.G. intervention.
12 Also the definition of the two sectors is different. They 
include in the exposed sector agriculture as well, which we 
have excluded because its performance is strongly affected 
by E.E.C. regulations.
13 Note that p^is the deflator of investment in machinery. Data
on the price of private investment in constructions net of 
residential investment are not available in the Italian 
statistics even on a yearly basis.
14 An estimation of a profit-maximizing investment equation of 
the Italian manufacturing sector from 1965 to 1982 can also be 
found in Bruno (1986).
15 See for example Sylos Labini (1967).
16 If we use the logarithm of the unemployment rate we implicitly 
assume that the pressure on wages of the unemployment 
rate increases less than proportionately the higher its 
absolute value (as is implicit in the concave shape of 
the logarithmic function). That leads us to assume that the 
short-term unemployed workers exert a greater downward 
pressure on wages than the long-run unemployed. See, on 
this point, Layard and Nickell (1986).
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17 The insider—outsider approach has been developed
theoretically in the last few years, mainly by Lindbeck 
and Snower (1984a,1984b). They work on the following idea:
" We represent involuntary unemployment as a 
condition which the insiders (the currently 
employed workers) impose on the outsiders (the 
currently unemployed workers). The insiders set 
the wages above the minimal level at which the 
outsiders would be willing to work, but the 
employers have no incentive to fire the insiders 
and hire the outsiders.
The reason is that the employers face costs of 
hiring which, in practice, are commonly quite 
substantial. Insiders take these costs into 
account in making their wage demands. Unionization 
may be explained as an effective way of doing 
so." (1984a,p.1-2)
18 One could imagine an even more extreme hypothesis, according 
to which the union, in forming its wage requests, looks at 
the rate of sectoral unemployment. According to our 
scenario this could be proxied by the percentage of 
workers in the wage supplementation fund (C.I.G.) over the 
total employed in the industrial sector. We do not use 
this variable, however, in order to- be consistent with the 
wage equation of sector 2, for which a proxy for sectoral 




In (1+ DUfc)= In Ufc- In 0fc_L=
Ufc= In (l-(Lt/LP )) = - " Pfc
where Lp is the total labour force and pfc is the probability of
being employed. Hence: DUt= Pt_^- Pt -
20 This observation is by Faustini (1986), in: "Retribuzioni e 
costo del lavoro in Italia tra il 1970 e il 1985", A.S.A.P. 
Report on Wages, p.61. See also table C, p.59. This 
inference is highly dependent on how wage differentials 
are defined and measured.
21 See on this point, Modigliani, Padoa Schioppa e Rossi (1986). 
They estimate a wage equation for the aggregate Italian 
economy on yearly data (1960—1983) and find that the 
long-term unemployment rate (i.e. with duration greater than 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS
In this study we have presented a theoretical model of the 
behaviour of firms and unions, viewing them as the main economic 
subjects in the labour market.
The model is built on the assumption that employment, 
investment and price decisions are taken by firms, whereas wage 
decisions are taken by unions.
Assuming imperfect competition in the product market and the 
existence of adjustment costs for the inputs of labour and capi-tal 
we have derived, from a problem of intertemporal profit- 
raaximization, the equations of labour demand, investment and 
prices.
The specification of the equation of the real cost of labour is 
derived integrating the firm's and union's behaviour in a'monopoly 
union model where the union sets wages and the firm sets 
employment.
Econometric estimation of the model based on Italian data for 
the sector which is exposed to international competition and the 
sector which is sheltered from it has allowed us to analyze the 
differences between the main causes of change in these two
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sectors, thus giving some insight into the question of structural 
change.
Our estimated equations track the data for the .sample period 
1970-1984 quite accurately, and we proceed to summarize the main 
findings of our research with a reasonable degree of confidence.
As far as employment is concerned, we note that firms in both 
sectors have been on their labour demand curve. The real cost of 
labour is, therefore, to be regarded as one of the main 
determinants of employment in the period considered. More 
specifically, our analysis was,oriented to measure -the different 
speed and degree of adjustment of employment in each sector to 
changes in the real cost of labour. Even if the short-run impact 
of the cost of labour on employment is approximately of the same 
size ( -.067 and -.077 in the exposed and sheltered sector
respectively), the lagged employment coefficients indicate a 
fairly slow response of sector 1 as compared to sector 2. 
Moreover, the long-run elasticity of employment with respect to 
the cost of labour is far higher in the exposed sector (-2.2) than 
in the sheltered sector (-.3).
These results give some insight into the issue of the rigidity 
of the Italian labour market (at least on the demand side; 
cfr.ch.l) in that they supply some econometric evidence on the 
role of adjustment costs that are connected to the input of
*
labour. Hiring and firing costs seem to be particularly high in 
the industrial sector, since they reduce considerably, as compared
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to the sheltered sector, the speed of adjustment of employment to 
changes in its explanatory variables.
Proceeding further with the supply side effects, the empirical 
analysis suggests that the rise in the price of imported raw 
materials has contributed to the decline in industrial employment, 
since labour and raw materials appear to be complementary factors 
of production. As it was reasonable to expect, moreover, we did 
not find any significative effect of the price of imported raw 
materials on employment in the sheltered sector.
A test on the form of the adjustment costs of capital in t-he 
industrial sector led us not to reject the hypothesis of internal 
adjustment costs, that is costs that are interrelated with the 
production process. A consequence of this assumption is that, as 
we have seen in chapter 2, investment appears between the 
explanatory variables of employment.
Our empirical finding leads us not to reject the hypothesis of 
a negatively relation between current investment and employment. 
This result seems to catch the effects of the intensive labour- 
substituting capital-deepening processes that have characterized 
industrial accumulation from the late '70s onwards, so as to be 
considered, by some economists, one of the major causes of the 
structural decline of employment in industry. Note that we do not 
get a similar effect in the sheltered sector, but we do not have 
enough elements to draw any conclusion on this result.
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The last supply effect we want to mention is that of the 
expected real interest rate • i= l,..n). This effect might
be the result of different mechanisms. Just to mention.two 
examples, an increase in tRt+  ̂ might lead the firm to make a more
intensive use of productive capacity today, since future revenues 
are more heavily discounted. In this case, employment might 
increase, but its cumulative change depends on the effect on 
capital. Alternatively, an increase in the expected real interest 
rate might discourage production and affect negatively employment 
in firms that expect to suffer from credit rationing.
In our model, the employment effect of the real interest rate 
is derived from the assumption that the firm is subject to costs 
of' adjusting its labour stock that are external to the productive 
process. According to this hypothesis, the firm's marginal cost is 
the sum of additional wage costs and the cost connected to 
changing its workforce. The latter is assumed to be more than 
proportionately increasing with the level of employment. In this 
framework, an increase in decreases the flow of expected
marginal revenues and the equilibrium condition of the profit
maximizing firm is affected. The employer, in order to re-equate
marginal cost and marginal revenue, decreases employment until the 
loss in revenue is exactly compensated by the reduction in the 
cost of replacing the vacancies (the assumption of increasing
marginal adjustment costs is therefore crucial for this result).
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Our econometric analysis has given evidence of a strong 
negative employment effect of the expected real interest rate in 
the industrial sector. No effect, instead, has been found in the 
sheltered sector.
Turning now to demand variables, they affect employment in our 
theoretical model if imperfect competition and a variable price 
elasticity of demand is assumed in the product market.
Our econometric estimates seem to support these hypotheses. 
Competitiveness is the crucial variable that influences industrial 
employment through demand for tradeable goods. This result is in 
line with the predictions of the theory on the 
"deindustrialization process", according to which the low degree * * % ' 
of competitiveness of the Italian tradeable goods in the period 
studied has some part in the transformation of a slowdown in 
employment growth in this sector in a merely structural decline.
In the sheltered sector, real expenditure conveys the positive 
employment effect of changes in demand for non-tradeable goods. It 
must be stressed, moreover, that, at variance with sector 1, real 
expenditure is the major cause of change in employment in this 
sector.
The estimated equations for investment lead us not to reject 
the profit maximizing model derived in ch.2. Our results show, in 
fact, that profitability has had a major role in determining 
investment decisions in both sectors. As in the case of
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employment, demand variables, proxied here by real expenditure 
changes, enter significatively both our investment equations.
A last observation, to conclude with firms' decisions, concerns 
prices. Our estimates seem to show that prices in sector 1 are the
result of a demand invariant mark-up over unit costs. In sector 2,
instead, a small influence of demand on price changes can be 
observed.
All these results, therefore, support the hypothesis of a 
variable elasticity of demand for goods trough which demand 
affects, according to our model, the decisions of firms.
Turning now to the cost of labour, we have chosen to embed its
theoretical determination in a monopoly unipn framework.
There are essentially two reasons for this choice, as we have 
explained in ch.3, one institutional and one theoretical. The 
former is based on the observation that, in the period studied and 
particularly during the '70s, unions have considerably increased 
their bargaining power and deeply affected the performance of the 
Italian economy. The latter concerns the capacity of this model to 
explain involuntary unemployment.
On the empirical side, however, it must be stressed again that 
a lot of work remains to be done in order to devise an econometric 
methodology which allows to ascertain the superiority of one model 
over the other among trade union theories. This issue, on the 
other hand, goes beyond the object of this research.
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Our result are quite satisfactory and allow us not to reject 
the model. The real cost of labour in each sector is
significatively affected by the discrepancy, between the
consumption and the product wage, the alternative wage of the 
other sector and unemployment.
In the exposed sector we also find a small but significative 
positive effect of competitiveness on wages. Its coefficient 
conveys the influence on wages of labour demand shifts due to 
changes in aggregate demand. Industrial wages, therefore, are 
influenced by the degree of openness of the economy through two
channels: the effect on consumption wage of changes in the price
of imported consumption goods and the effect on demand for labour 
of changes in competitiveness.
The coefficient on the alternative wage can be interpreted as 
reflecting the degree of union strength. In other words, it 
measures the union's reaction in terms of wage pressure to an 
increase in the wage of the other sector. Our empirical finding 
indicates a higher degree of union strength in the industrial 
sector as compared to the sheltered sector.
We have shown in ch.3 that the unemployment rate is the crucial 
variable which distinguishes a trade union model from a 
competitive model of the labour market. In the sheltered sector we 
have found the coefficients of both the level and the change of 
the unemployment rate to be negative and significant. In the
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exposed sector, instead, only the change in the unemployment rate 
is significant.
Our tentative interpretation of this result relies on the 
distinction of unionised members between "insiders" (employed) and 
"outsiders" (unemployed). If the insiders have acquired a higher 
degree of monopoly power (e.g. some firm-specific skills) as 
compared to the outsiders, they will not regard them as potential 
competitors. If the insiders have the power to chose the policy of 
the union, they will not be concerned with the current state of 
the labour market (whose best indicator is the unemployment rate) 
but with its changes. Changes in the unemployment rate, in fact, 
represent the .probability of a change in the insider's current 
state.
In the sheltered sector, instead, the insiders ¿regard the 
outsiders as potential competitors to whom the employers might 
resort if the union's wage requests are excessive.
We have attempted, in this study, to focus on firms' and 
unions’ decisions within a unified framework, with the aim of 
taking account of supply and demand factors by means of a rigorous 
theoretical analysis. More work is needed to improve the model 
from the theoretical point of view.
At this stage, however, we think that econometric estimation of 
the model has given some insight into the issue of structural 
change of the Italian economy.
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A P P E N D IX  I I
DATA AND S T A T I S T I C A L  SO U R C E S
1  : ENERGY +  M ANUFACTURING IN D U STR Y
2  : MARKET S E R V IC E S  +  B U IL D IN G  IN D U STR Y
A L L  S E R I E S  ARE D E SE A SO N A L IZ E D

I
PRAW: INDEX CF PRICE IN DOLLARS OF IMPORTER RAW MATERIALS 70-100
SOURCE: PROMETEIA 
PflF INDEX OF PRICE IK DOLLARS OF IMPORTED MANUFACTURED COMPETING 
eOODS 1970-100 
SOURCE: PROMETEIA 
ER INDEX OF THE LIRA/US* EXCHANGE RATE 1970«100 
SOURCE. BANK OF ITALY 
PI : VALUE ADDED DEFLATOR OF SECTOR 1 70-100
SOURCE: OUR ELABORATION ON ISTAT DATA
P S  : VALUE ADDED DEFLATOR OF SECTOR 2 70=100
SOURCE: CUR ELABORATION ON ISTAT DATA
PRAW PHF ER P1 P2——  — — ----- ------ ----------- --- — ------- ----- -------------—
1970: 1 1 99 38399 98 74300 100. 32999 93 30978 95 61113
1970: 2 : loo 37999 101 56000 100. 29997 98. 54603 98 81898
1970:3 1 100 33999 101 36999 100. 00998 102. 52844 100. 96003
1970: 4 ! 99 69299 98 12700 99, 33298 105. 50465 104. 41776
1971:1 1 102 14999 98 73999 99. 35298 102. 34473 103. 61955
1971: 2 ! 102. 31999 99 32499 99. 37198 102. 75230 105. 89645
1971:3 : 101 36000 102 17999 98. 62099 112.23987 108. 11879
1971; 4 : 101 62000 101 89000 97. 00698 IOS. 05457 110. 12376
1972:I ! 107 36999 109 01999 93. 55899 108. 54440 109. 12715
1972:2 1 100 20000 10<?. 81000 92. 83699 110 92168 112. 89137
1972:3 : n o 84000 111 45999 92. 68098 115. 46172 114.80888
1972:4 !. 114 70000 112. 48000 93 05698 111. 03481 119. 05669
1973:1 : 136 38998 119 64999 '92. 20999 116 77708 120. 60527
1973:2 149 <2999 130. 47998 94. 34099 116 95862 123. 64799
1973:3 ! 169.98999 143. 42999 91. 32399 128.03973 127. 08800
1973:4 : lei. OOOOO 146. 12997 93. 79398 130 85480 129. 65253
1974:1 1 198. 03000 149. 31999 102. 93999 136.63833 137. 43692
1974: 2 ¡ 217. 21997 166. 62997 101. 80997 140 21100 143. 96881
1974:3 ; 222. 03000 176. 62997 104. 19998 154.75583 132. 19932
1974: 4 ! 224. 87000 180. 23998 105. 85999 162. 72928 162. 16504
1973: 1 í 223. 33000 189. 64999 101. 68997 170.38203 170. 94049
1973:2 : 213. 37000 187 69990 100. 23999 173. 34575 176. 09613
1973: 3 ! 202. 33998 179. 38998 105. 97998 191. 32214 181. 24512
1975: 4 ! 200. 28998 177. 16998 108. 43999 182.41452 186. 21024
1976: 1 1 189. 72998 164. 12000 121. 74998 209. 31027 200. 23727
1976: 2 ! 206. 82999 182. 56000 137 41998 205. 98401 206. 65341
1976:3 ! 213. 44998 183. 18997 133. 87997 215.32999 210. 36594
1976: 4 ¡ 223. 34000 190. 73990 137. 56998 205. 92499 217 05406
1977: 1 ! 226. 87000 189. 93997 140. 74997 237. 93047 228 70081
1977:2 • 230. 39000 193. 39000 141. 31998 246. 34677 239 21017
1977:3 1 228. 84000 198. 07999 140. 74997 247. 34713 251. 03836
1977: 4 222. 16998 199. 28000 140. 01999 235. 64087 260 46649
1978:1 ! 237. 84998 211. 56000 137 42996 266. 33478 263.22815
1978:2 ! 234. 07999 217. 32999 137 51996 • 273. 54468 271. 50317
1978:3 ! 236. 81000 222. «5999 133. 62000 I 273. 37700 285. 08103
1978:4 ¡ 249. 73999 228 48999 132. 73999 300 70258 291. 93127
1979: 1 ! 277. 83997 246. 81998 133.80997 296. 55017 304. 22443
1979:2 ! 296. 37996 233. 95999 135. 06998 315.89624 316. 81207
1979: 3 ! 313 33999 266. 19995 130 22990 316 49744 329. 64032
1979: 4 i 321. 33997 276. 12994 130. 8699í. 347. 62677 344. 03900
1980: 1 : 340. 79893 292. 83899 131. 64999 361. 79675 374 38184
1980:2 1 333. 46293 288. 27399 135. 26999 381. 09873 388. 13391
1980:3 ! 344. 91699 303. 32300 134. 53998 370.11760 406. 68207
1980:4 I 338. 23696 297. 49298 144. 16998 394. 73663 421. 66400
1981:1 1 322. 36397 296. 31696 159. 77997 403. 02893 432. 67438
1981:2 ! 321. 68896 279. 46198 180. 85999 424.48352 461. 16150
1981:3 ; 310.83797 287. 34796 193. 79999 435. 90448 476. 07922
1981:4 ! 319. 30396 282. 38293 191. 09998 454.41266 495. 20294
1982:1 1 310. 32697 277. 79396 201. 21997 485. 76385 520. 30396
1982:2 1 274.14398 270. 16998 210. 34996 502. 11938 537. 84790
1982: 3 ! 267.43398 277. 39294 222. 22995 307. 77924 530. 92310
1982: 4 i 263. 60297 239. 78894 228. 77997 530. 96135 591. 09766
1983: 1 ! 267. 93996 280. 40394 223. 15997 567. 68872 616. 85923
1983.2 ! 264. 04797 243. 13399 235. 64996 383. 34033 629. 89573
1983: 3 ¡ 260. 19299 232. 04099 231. 04999 381. 16272 647. 43342
1983: 4 1 236. 39496 236. 09698 239. 12994 611.41968 672. 83154
1984: 1 1 236.73397 243. 37299 263. 10992 629. 20393 692. 26123
1984:2 294. 40997 244. 28098 267. 17993 632. 77942 713. 17303
1984:3 1 231. 79700 234. 74298 287. 03998 629.37713 713. 15735




COMP : (PMF-*ER> /PI
PCD ; DEFLATOR OF HOUSEHOLDS' CONSUMPTION*70=100 
SOURCE: ISTAT
PI : DEFLATOR OF FIXED CROSS INVESTMENT IN MACHINERY V0«100
SOURCE: ISTAT
RPRAW1 RPRAW2 COMP PCD PI
1970: 1 106. 63478 104. 29113 103. 94489 97 74149 99. 75819
1970:2 102. 16635 101. 88437 103. 36733 99 20761 99. 44987
1970: 3 98_ 07037 99. 38600 99 07307 100. 63054 97 86874
1970: 4 •> 93. 8612B 94. 83830 92. 38689 102. 35432 102. 94093
1971: 1 «1 99. 16394 97. 94394 95 87303 103. 51512 106. 41801
1971: 2 1• 98. 93390 96. 01587 96.25084 104 65854 109. 57335
1971: 3 f• 89. 23698 92. 63837 89. 78175 106.11725 112.15746
1971: 4 11 90. 63449 89. 58992 90. 87331 107 61760 113. 44102
1972: 1 «« 92. 71910 92. 22397 93. 96892 109.07161 113. 03606
1972: 2 I1 90. 33905 88. 97900 91. 90656 110. 38878 114 31401
1973:3 •1 88.97113 89. 47705 89. 46881 113.05214 116. 18329
1972: 4 96. 12074 89. 65170 94 26817 116.13039 118. 32379
1973: 1 I< 108.09161 104.66063 94. 47850 119 78549 124 73330
1973: 2 t1 120.33300 114. 01213 103. 24736 124 30553 132. 55246
1973:3 «1 121.24489 122. 13288 102 30106 128.34708 138.04184
1973: 4 1• 129. 73700 130. 94006 104. 74290 131 91534 141. 15652
1974: 1 11 149. 16913 148. 32407 112. 62822 139 70761 157. 86676
1974: 2 137.72769 133. 61073 120. W332 147.16376 165 08936
1974:3 •1 14 9. 49692 132. 00784 118 92824 136. 71127 176. 98007
1974: 4 i1 146.28427 146. 79324 117. 26421 166.60783 191. 71567
1973: 1 133. 23412 132. 97470 113. 05707 172.31529 194. 11758
1973: 2 14 123. 24246 121. 43733 108. 41347 176. 76352 198. 64429
1975:3 ’ * * 112. 19394 118. 43179 99. 64731 181. 49106 203. 17117
1975: 4 I1 119.06641 116. 63936 105 32227 186. 63013 207 92090
1976: 1 1» 11 0. 36067 113 36123 95 46405 194. 56268 214. 83478
1976: 2 •* 137. 98434 137 33738 121 79291 207. 23309 230. 48398
1976:3 •< 132. 71109 135. 84271 113.14064 215.38038 240. 22406
1976:4 1 1 4 9 . 20422 141. 55405 127. 43887 2 2 9 . 30522 249 76301
1977:1 I1 134.19577 139 62323 112. 33130 236. 83716 258. 21753
1977:2 1• 132. 28089 136. 22736 112. 20271 246 42813 272. 87085
1977:3 14 130.11346 128. 30399 112. 62401 255.31866 274 16313
1977: 4 «J 121.68726 119. 43279 109 14992 262.35760 285. 97843
1978: 1 1 122. 73167 124. 18016 109. 16392 269.47113 287 13611
1978:2 1 117. 67976 118. 56462 109 23899 278. 21350 288. 97205
1978: 3 »t 114. 90627 110. 99492 107. 94327 287 60156 297 31219
1978: 4 1« 110.24342 113. 55379 100 86298 294 35737 308 61902
1979: 1 «» 123. 36732 122. 20303 111 37062 303 08698 317 06946
1979: 2 1a 126.81078 126. 44420 108. 38746 316. 34388 323. 67131
1979:3 •« 129.76196 124. 3B830 109 33395 330. 30872 337 14728
1979: 4 <t 120. 97386 122. 23343 103 933'8 346 96393 332. 89331
1980: 1 r* 124. 00934 119. 84068 106 35773 363. 69067 374. 62341
1980: 2 t* 119.07169 116. 91344 102 32208 381.02039 384. 19202
1980: 3 4« 122. 72667 114. 10664 107 92690 398. 76770 398. 74127
1980:4 41 123. 34187 113. 63231 108. 63361 417 49170 401. 06189
1981: 1 127. 80130 113. 78316 117. 47423 436. 76350 432. 83956
1901: 2 11 137. 06223 126. 16113 119 07036 436 86218 449. 32666
1981:3 1I 141.76193 129 79913 127. 73282 474. 75238 462. 20966
1981: 4 «i 134. 28098 123. 22014 118 83823 493. 09233 476. 41248
1982:1 ! 128. 34800 120. 01443 113. 07237 313.09424 484. 32332
1982: 2 t 114.93474 107. 31843 113. 28836 331.36189 510. 03760
1982:3 : 117. 03142 106. 34071 121. 40121 557 41284 308 90283
1982: 4 i 1 1 3 . 30087 102. 02337 111.93730 579. 82617 328 69763
1983: 1 * 103. 33378 96. 93933 110. 22833 600 66443 326. 63672
1983: 2 I 106. 66633 98. 78284 98. 21880 619.53491 348. 03784
1983: 3 Í 112 . 39786 100. 89261 108. 87636 637.18762 350. 89600
1983:4 1 10B. 66449 98. 74628 100. 06187 656.23486 560 59704
1984: 1 J 108. 18083 98. 32709 102. 54289 674. 01392 579 30439
1984: 2 ! 104. 12897 95 31075 99. 98320 693.48926 614 66882
1984: 3 i 114. 80033 101 06281 107. 02319 706. 09814 608. 18127
1984:4 : 111. 96049 101 43913 99 11743 718. 00403 612. 33948
I l l
EMI NO. OF EMPLOYEES IN SECTOR 1 <THOUSAND)
SOURCE: 3ANK OF ITALY« THE SERIES IS NET 
OF WORKERS IN C. I. G 
0CD2 NO. OF EMPLOYEES IN SECTOR 2 (THOUSAND)
SOURCE: ISTAT
CL 1 COST OF LABOUR PER EMPLOYEE SECTOR 1:
TOTAL LABOUR COST / EMI 
MILLION LIRAS 
SOURCE: ISTAT
CL2 ' COST OF LABOUR PER EMPLOYEE SECTOR 2:
TOTAL LABOUR COST / 0CD2 
MILLION LIRAS 
SOURCE: ISTAT
RCL1 : REAL COST OF LABOUR PER EMPLOYEE SECTOR 1
CL1/PI J MILLION LIRAS 
RCL2 : REAL COST OF LABOUR PER EMPLOYEE SECTOR 2
CL2/P2 i MILLION LIRAS
EH1 0CD2 CL1 CL 2 RCL1 RCL2
1970: 1 4774. 91016 4708. 42969 0. 58972 0. 53191 0. 63065 0. 55633
1970: 2 4792. 28516 4716. 31953 0. 59240 0. 55138 0. 60114 0 55796
1970: 3 4824. 66211 4705. 63918 0. 61711 0. 58189 0 60189 0. 57631
1970.4 4832. 24316 4683. 37988 0. 63863 0. 60352 0. 60333 0. 57799
1971:1 4865. 12695 4654. 88867 0. 65810 0 62448 0. 64302 0. 60267
1971: 2 4833. 23633 4676. 63918 0. 67154 0 63811 0. 63335 0 60258
1971:3 4812. 31934 4638. 74902 0. 69098 0. 63605 0. 61563 0. 60679
1971: 4 4793. 39746 4633. 68943 0. 71364 0. 66942 0. 65559 0 60788
1972: 1 479S. 25000 4682. 06934 0, 74244 0. 68654 0. 68400 0. 62912
1972: 2 4813. 43652 4649. 78906 0. 74569 0. 70183 0. 67226 0. 62169
1972: 3 4815. 44434 4637.. 03906 0. 75056 0. 72481 0. 63005 0. 63132
1972:4 4817. 50781 4653. 09961 0. 78912 0. 75168 0 71069 0. 63136
1973:1 4834. 29492 4618. 11914 0. 79947 0. 80764 0. 68461 0. 66966
1973: 2 4092. 67578 4663. 37B91 0. 90303 , 0. 84449 0. 77209 0. 68298
1973: 3 4964. 49316 4711. 0498Ó 0. 97175 0. 89498 0. 75894 0. 70422
1973: 4 3005. 83105 4743. 44922 0 99984 0. 93695 0. 76408 0. 72266
1974: 1 5050. 51367 4738. 60937 1. 04212 0 99092 0. 76257 0. 72100
1974: 2 5035. 69824 4732. 80957 1. 12819 1 03912 0. 80464 O. 72176
1974:3 4997. 73145 4775. 40918 1. 15327 1. 10974 0. 74522 0. 72914
1974 4 4996. 71S75 4829. 17969 1 21277 1. 17685 0. 74527 0 72571
1975: 1 4926. 82227 4804. 46875 1. 33553 1. 25459 0 78293 0 73393
1975: 2 4884. 76172 4787. 01953 1. 38126 1. 32017 0. 79590 0. 74969
1975: 3 4880. 34766 4817. 16B95 1 45823 1.36325 0. 76219 0. 75216
1975:4 4873. 31641 4807, 33984 1. 30398 1. 41457 0. 82449 0. 73967
1976: 1 4874. 35352 4827. 74902 1 52550 1. 46213 0. 72882 0. 73020
1976: 2 4955. 01758 4970. 82910 1.67303 1. 55445 0. B1221 0. 75220
1976: 3 5036. 72363 4839. 79883 1. 80146 1. 64060 0. 83661 0. 77988
1976: 4 5053. 64062 4941. 61914 1. 90694 1. 72420 0. 92604 0. 79436
1977:1 3040 41992 4889. 34961 1. 91617 1.79846 0. 80528 0. 78638
1977: 2 5018. 55957 4917. 63965 2. 06964 1.90756 0. 84013 0. 79744
1977: 3 4950. 25000 4898. 99902 2. 12561 1. 98503 0. 85867 0 79073
1977:4 4900. 23730 4914. 00977 2. 18585 2. 05503 0. 85505 0. 78898
197B: 1 4914. 03613 4948. 0S984 2. 29833 2 11469 0. 96296 0. 80337
1978: 2 4696. 15234 4990. 38867 2. 33301 2. 18445 0. 85288 0. 80458
1978: 3 4896. 75293 3009. 01933 2. 41329 2. 28134 0. 87636 0. 80031
1978: 4 4694. 41699 3052. 49902 2. 30181 2. 36386 0. 83199 0. 80973
1979: 1 4885. 21973 5117 06934 2. 61221 2. 42664 0. 88086 0 79765
1979: 2 4940. 16113 5142. 29980 2. 63977 2. 53523 0. 83565 0 80023
1979: 3 4958. 39453 517B. 82910 2. 83209 2. 68363 0. 89482 0. 81411
1979: 4 5C06. 22461 5189. 78906 2. 98360 2. 81559 0. 85885 0. 81839
1980: 1 4986. 51660 5175. 98926 3. 117B7 2. 99200 0. 86177 0. 79918
19B0: 2 4988. 47266 3237 03906 3. 24925 3. 13538 0. 83260 0, 81296
1980: 3 4934 83281 3290. 56934 3. 36897 3. 31093 0. 89099 0. 81413
1980:4 4853. 36133 5328. 40918 3. 50666 3. 46839 0. 88835 0. B2255
1981: 1 - 4784. 81152 5334 82910 3. 71147 3. 58442 0. 92089 0. 79183
1981:2 4716. 39453 5357. 36914 4. 03999 3. 75972 0 95174 0. 81527
1981: 3 4664. 14355 5420. 12891 4. 23437 3. 90515 0. 97140 0 82027
1981: 4 4621. 57617 5411. 66895 4. 46837 4. 09822 0. 98333 0. 82758
1982: 1 4642. 17090 5452. 32910 4. 57004 4 25047 0. 94079 0. 81692
1982:2 4583. 41406 5457. 97949 4 75994 4. 40215 0. 94797 0. 81847
19B2 3 4309. 80762 3459: 68943 3. 01538 4. 56865 0. 98771 0. 81740
1982: 4 4448. 28906 3502. 00977 5. 24480 4. 77689 0.98779 0. 80814
1983: 1 4398. 70215 5503. 37988 5. 35440 5. 00284 0 94319 0 81102
1983: 2 4323. 71191 5495. 80957 5. 63243 5. 16966 0. 96555 0. 82072
1983: 3 4317. 92773 5494. 09863 5. 92821 5. 35748 1. 02006 0. 82749
1983: 4 4264. 03664 5538 71973 6. 09293 5. 49376 0. 99652 0 81681
1984:1 1 4196. 77339 5573. 74902 6. 36379 5. 64288 1. 01140 0 81514
1984:2 4139. 69238 5610. 33887 6. 42545 5. 75719 0. 98432 0. 80726
1984:3 4060. 10645 5647. 65918 6. 57042 5. 90432 1. 04362 0. 82560
1984: 4 4058. 72021 5680 23926 6 79377 6. 04338 1. 01354 0. 81686
GWE1 GROSS WASES PER EMPLOYEE SECTOR 1
TOTAL GROSS WACES / EMI 
MILLION LIRAS 
SOURCE : ISTAT
GWE2 GROSS WAGES PER EMPLOYEE SECTOR 2
TOTAL GROSS WAGES / 0CD2 
MILLION LIRAS 
SOURCE : ISTAT
ROUl PEAL GROSS WACES PER EMPLOYEE SECTOR 1
CWE1 / PCD
RCW2 REAL GROSS WAGES PER EMPLOYEE SECTOR 2
GWE2 / PCD
Til TAX RATE OiN LABOUR COSTS BORNE BY FIRMS
IN SECTOR li X ON GWE1 
T12 TAX RATE ON LABOUR COSTS BORNE BY FIRMS
IN SECTOR 2i X  ON GWE2
IV
CWE1 «wes RGW1 RGU2 Til T 12
1770:1 0. 39823 0. 37210 0. 40744 0. 38070 48. 08401 42 94613
1970:2 0. 40036 0. 38347 0. 40376 0. 38855 47.89201 43. 03888
1970: 3 0. 41727 0. 40639 0. 41466 0. 40404 47. 89201 43. 11327
1970: 4 0. 43239 0. 42198 0.42245 0. 41228 47. 70001 43 02023
1971:1 0. 44771 0. 43332 0. 43251 0. 41860 46. 99203 44.11736
1971: 2 0. 43806 0. 44193 0. 43767 0. 42226 46. 60402 44 39036
1971: 3 0. 47194 0. 43333 0 44474 0. 42720 46.41202 44.71828
1971:4 0. 48742 0. 46233 0. 45292 0. 42960 46. 41202 44. 79236
1972: 1 0. 30346 0. 47425 0, 46158 0 43481 47. 46801 44 76333
1972:2 0. 30366 0. 48491 0. 43724 0. 43848 47 46802 44, 73349
1972: 3 0. 30897 0. 30084 0. 43020 0. 44301 47 46800 44. 72076
1972: 4 0. 53511 0. 51944 0. 46078 0. 44729 47 46799 44. 70904
1973:1 . 0. 33124 0. 56192 0 46019 0. 46910 43.03201 43 72921
1973: 2 0. 62343 0. 58778 0. 30133 0. 47283 44 84400 43. 674 52
1973: 3 0. 67089 0. 62294 0. 52272 0. 48336' 44. 84399 43. 67000
1973: 4 0. 68939 0. 63196 O. 32260 0. 49424 4 3 CT3201 43. 70870
1974: 1 0. 71838 0. 67662 0. 51435 0. 43431 45. 02400 46. 43017
1974: 2 0. 77392 0. 70596 0. 32723 0. 47971 45. 39999 47. 19232
1974: 3 0. 78608 0. 73155 0 30161 0 47938 46. 71201 47. 66063
1974: 4 0. 82692 0. 79617 O. 49633 0 47787 46. 66201 47. 81477
1973: 1 0- 90332 0. 84915 0. 52361 0. 49222 47 84800 47. 74704
1973: 2 0. 93424 0. 89305 0. 52853 0. 30522 47. 84801 47 B2633
1975: 3 0. 98693 0. 92129 0. 54380 0. 50762 47. 75201 47. 97099
1973: 4 1. 01857 0. 95522 0. 34577 0. 51182 47.65600 48 08943
1976: 1 1. 02927 0. 98737 0. 32902 0 30748 48.21200 48-08335
1976: 2 1. 12881 I. 04684 0. 34471 0. 30315 48. 21201 48 48896
1976: 3 1. 21623 1. 10199 0. 56418 0. 51117 48. 11601 48. 87566
1976: 4 1. 28810 1. 13938 0. 36125 0. 50517 48.04301 48. 71722
1977:1 1. 34667 1. 23199 0. 36860 0. 52863 42. 28999 43 64837
1977:2 1.48202 1. 33386 0. 60140 0. 54128 39. 64999 43 01044
1977:3 1. 53120 1. 38989 0. 59972 0 34437 38. 82000 42. 81898
1977.4 1. 37210 1. 43833 0. 59922 0. 34823 39 04000 42. 87392
1978: 1 1. 65029 1. 47846 0. 61242 0. 54863 39 27000 43 03275
1978: 2 1. 67313 1. 32681 0 60138 0 54879 39. 44000 43. 07342
1978: 3 1 74320 1. 60231 0. 60612 0. 55720 38. 44001 42. 37283
1978: 4 1 50806 1. 66216 0. 61382 0. 56429 38. 37002 42. 21642.
1979: 1 1. 88621 1. 71331 0 61825 0 36240 38. 49000 41. 42808
1979: 2 1.90240 1. 79159 0. 60079 0. 56399 38. 76000 41. 30684
1979: 3 2. 03997 1. 89650 0 61759 0 37416 38. 83002 41. 30416
1979: 4 2. 14114 1. 98744 0. 61711 0 37281 39. 44001 41 66897
1980: 1 2. 23410 2. 10998 0. 61639 0. 37698 38. 32001 41 80211
1980:2 2. 34313 2. 22370 0. 61497 0. 58362 38. 67001 41. 09773
1980:3 2. 33497 2„33504 0. 63570 0. 59038 32. 89999 40. 38898
1980:4 2. 64714 2 46931 0.63406 0. 39146 32. 47001 40. 46026
1981: 1 2. 78221 2. 53369 0. 63700 0. 38314 33. 4COO 1 40. 23249
1981: 2 3. 02848 2. 68021 0. 66289 0. 58666 ' 33. 39999 40.27686
1981: 3 3. 17419 2. 78371 0. 66860 0 58633 33. 40000 40. 28602
1981:4 3. 34960 2. 92160 0. 67636 0 59011 33. 39999 40. 27334
1982:1 ! 3. 33093 3. 02389 0. 64919 0 58934 37. 20000 40. 36294
1982: 2 i 3. 46934 3. 13137 0. 65267 0 50909 37. 20000 40 38224
1982: 3 3. 59990 3. 18738 0. 64382 0 57185 39. 32000 43. 32650
1982: 4 3. 76457 3. 33256 0.64926 0. 37475 39. 32001 43 34006
1983:1 3. 79556 3. 46738 0 63189 0. 57726 41.07001 44 28324
1983: 2 3. 99265 3. 50288 0 64445 0. 57832 41. 07001 44. 28791
1983:3 1 4. 20232 3. 71396 0. 63951 0. 58287 41. 07002 44 25246
1983: 4 1 4. 31786 3. 00898 0. 63797 0. 50043 41. 11002 44. 28448
1984: 1 ! 4. 44641 3. B9269 0. 65969 0, 57754 43. 12199 44. 96107
1984:2 i 4. 48949 3. 97140 0 64738 0 57267 43. 12200 44. 96631
1984:3 i 4. 39078 4. 07232 0. 65016 0. 57676 43. 12202 44 97953
1984:4 ! 4. 74684 4.16926 0 66112 0. 58053 43. 12202 44 98591
V
INTEREST ON SANK LOANS 
%
SOURCE : PROMETEIA
EXPECTED REAL INTEREST RATE IN SECTOR 1 
RBC - ((PI(1)-P1(-3)>-l)*lQO
X
EXPECTED REAL INTEREST RATE IN SECTOR 2
RBC - ((P2(1>-P2(-2>>-1>»100
WED1 TAX UEOSE IN SECTOR 1
(PCD*( 1 t-Tll >/Pl 
WED2 TAX WEDGE IN SECTOR ?
(PCDM 1 +T12J/P2 




1970: 1 1 54785 1. 46131
1970: 2 1. 48835 1. 43601
1970:3 1 45154 1. 42635
1970: 4 1. 43290 1. 40194
1971: 1 1. 43673 1 43972
1971:2 1.49324 1. 42703
1971: 3 1.38425 1. 42039
1971: 4 1. 44748 1. 41497
1972: 1 li48184 1. 44690
1972: 2 1 47025 1. 41781
1972: 3 1. 44390 1 ./42506
1972: 4 1. 54236 1. 41132
1973: 1 1. 48768 1. 42752
1973:2 1. 53943 1. 44439
1973:3 1.45192. 1. 43093
1973:4 1. 46207 1 46217
1974: 1 ' 1. 48260 1 48870
1974; 2 1. 52610 1. 50459
1974:3 1. 48566 1 52038
1974: 4 1 50158 1 51864
1975: 1 1. 49524 1. 49108
1973: 2 1.50389 1.48387
1973:3 1. 40160 1. 4B172
1973: « 1. 51068 1. 48423
1976: 1 1. 37769 1. 43887
1976: 2 1. 49111 1. 48905
1976: 3 1. 48288 1. 52566
1976: 4 1. 64995 1. 57248
1977:1 1 41624 1. 48759
1977:2 1. 39696 1. 47326
1977:3 1. 43178 1. 45254
1977:4 1. 42693 1. 43913
1978: 1 1. 40910 1. 46425
1978:2 1. 41820 1. 46610
1970:3 1. 44596 1. 43632
1978:4 1. 35542 1 43496
1979:1 1. 42477 1. 41829
1979:2 1. 39044 1. 41387
1979: 3 1. 44888 1. 41791
1979:4 1. 39174 1 42873
1980:1 1. 39809 1 38310
1980: 2 1. 38641 1.39297
1980:3 1. 40158 1.37833
1980:4 1. 40106 1.39070
1981:1 1.44367 1. 35323
1981:2 1. 43575 1. 38969
1981:3 1. 45289 1. 39895
1981: 4 1. 45342 1. 40242
1982: 1 1. 44919 1. 38615
1982:2 1. 45245 1. 38939
1982:3 1. 32938 1 43939
1982:4 1. 52142 1. 40607
1983: 1 1. 49264 1. 40495
1983:2 1 49823 I. T m - 3
1983:3 1. 34669 1. 41969
1983:4 1. 51433 1 40725
1984:1 1. 53314 1. 41140
1984:2 1.52048 1.40965
1984:3 ! 1.60318 1. 43143
1904:4 1 1. 33307 1. 40709
RBC RRBC1 RRBC2
8. 22000 MISSINC VALU MISSING VALU
9 15000 MISSING VALU MISSING VALU
9. 58000 MISSINC VALU MISSINC VALU
9 66000 0 21185 1. 28396
9. 53000 5. 26169 2. 36795
9. 14000 -0. 33193 2. 05780
8. 86000 5 68486 3. 39540
8. 60000 2. 54236 3. 28479
8 32000 0. 36945 1. 71457
7. 91000 5. 03950 1. 72227
7. 74000 5. 73711 -O. 37171
7 56000 -O 02462 -2. 95811
7. 61000 2. 16747 -1. 91829
7. 36000 -3. 33367 -3. 13526
8. 3^000 -9. 29025 -0. 32983
9. 51000 -7 51495 . -4. 44598
10. 09000 -9. 79086 -6. 34441
13. 02000 -7.84547 -6. 73916
16. 38000 -7. 97866 -8. 69665
17. 37000 -7. 45374 -7. 00742
17 90000 -3. 87470 -4. 41547
15. 92000 -7. 70839 -3. 16389
14. 26000 2. 16307 -0. 56761
12. 25000 -10. 45359 -4 88859
12. 81000 -5. 88148 -4. 54261
17. 63000 5. 08161 1. 56291
19. 27000 6. 38151 2. 70601
19. 60000 5. 91687 5. 38510
19. 71000 0. 11491 3. 95572
19. 32000 4. 33824 -0. 01413
18. 27000 -3. 87271 -1. 73074
17. 02000 3. 09134 1. 92283
16, 50000 3. 45950 3. 00015
16. 19000 4. 94773 2. 62925
16. 06000 -1. 56696 3. 97983
15. 26000 3.91511 -O. 31443
15. 30000 -0. 18250 -1. 38816
15. 03000 0. 09762 -0. 60039
15. OlOOO -0. 59485 -2. 83931
16 36000 -5. 64187 -6. 70107
18 73000 -1 91048 -3. 78235
19. 15000 -0. 31943 -4. 22146
19. 51000 5. 95815 -3. 05285
20. 25000 8. 85349 -O. 66249
20. 63000 9. 24587 1. 81495
21. 66000 6. 57724 4 79577
22. 34000 7. 42206 5. 09982
22. 29000 1. 76171 7. 34999
22. 1 lOOO 3. 82051 5. 48103
21. 8300C 5. 34135 4. 42872
21. 63000 4. 80432 2. 28527
20. 99000 4. 12484 2. 43252
20. 67000 4. 49438 3. 33390
19 60000 3. 14815 3. 76377
19. 08000 3. 92671 3. 25252
19. OOOOO 8. 16357 6. 77647
18. 38000 6. 47630 5. 15887
17. 61000 9. 27938 7. 14997
17.43000 7. 79937 7. 47266
17.49000 MISSINO VALU MISSINO VALU
RIFLI REAL INVESTMENT CF SECTOR 1 PRICES OF 1970
BILLION LIRAS
CUR ELABORATION ON ISTAT SERIES 
R 12 REAL INVESTMENT OF SECTOR 2 PRICES OF 1970
BILLION LIRAS
OUR ELABORATION ON ISTAT SERIES
XI CAPITAL STOCK OF SECTOR 1 PRICES OF 1970
BILLION LIRAS
o u r e l a b o r a t i o n  on i s t a t s e r i e s  
K2 CAPITAL STOCK OF SECTOR 2 PRICES OF 1970
3 ILLION LIRAS
OUR ELABORATION ON ISTAT SERIES 
REXP REAL EXPENDITURE PRICES OF 1970
INVESTMEMT-»CCNSUf!PTION+TRADE BALANCE 
SOURCE : ISTAT
UC UNEMPLOYMENT RATE NET OF WORKERS IN C.I.3.
SOURCE : BANK OF ITALY
VI
RIFLI R 12
1970 1 935. 10994 830 45996
1970: 2 964 92993 858. 35994
1770: 3 933. 02991 333 96997
1970: 4 933. 62988 831.26990
1971:1 948. 37988 877.43994
1971:2 944 16992 873. 69993
1971: 3 924. 13989 833. 38989
1971:4 933. 14990 868. 48999
1972: 1 923. 62988 925. 79993
1972: 2 887 70996 883. 33994
1972: 3 918. 05994 919.67993
1972 4 910. 67993 911.62988
1973: 1 934. 31990 ' • 936. 37988
1973: 2 1003. OOOOO ' 986 92993
1973: 3 106*. 79980 1053. 19995
1973: 4 1093. 69993 1073. 29980
1974: 1 1119. 09985 1080. 23977
1974:2 1113. 49976 1073. 38989
1974 3 1101. 89990 1063. 19995
1974: 4 1030. 49976 992. 23999
1975: 1 873. 81993 940.09998
1975:2 860. 73999 926. 03992
1975: 3 831. 48999 892. 96997
1975: 4 852. 71997 918. 02991
1976 1 830. COOOO 992. 43994
1976: 2 829. 38989 991. 60999
1976:3 849. 94995 1017 44993
1976 4 868. 56995 1041. 55931
1977: 1 863. 73999 1065 33984
1977: 2 848. 9899*» 1046. 62988
1977: 3 622. 30994 1012. 34998
1977: 4 812. 93996 998. 87000
1978: 1 782. 94995 1012. 90991
1978: 2 800. 09998 1037. 69993
1978: 3 807. 54993 1046. 95996
1978:4 815. 24908 1057. 59985
1979:1 858. B3997 1043. 48999
1979:2 873. 23989 1062. 46997
1979: 3 898. 37988 1094. 29980
1979:4 951. 67993 1162. 95996
1980:1 1C04. 79993 1189. 27979
1980: 2 1013. 79993 1202. 54980
1980:3 1032. 39990 1227. 75977
1980: 4 1063 89990 1273. 28979
1981: 1 1031 OOOOO 1338. 07983
1981:2 1010. OOOOO 1304. 86987
1981:3 966. 12000 1236. 87988
1981: 4 957. 81993 1225. 56982
1982:1 902. 33997 1278. 17993
1982: 2 886. 28992 1254. 01978
1982:3 853 43994 1212. 64990
1982: 4 861, 89990 1217. 38989
1983: 1 803. 81993 1219. 04980
1983:2 814. 31995 1238. 24976
1983: 3 810. 62000 1231. 10986
1983:4 623. 10999 1265. 39985
1984: 1 1 843. 45996 1248. 79980
1984:2 i 862. 90991 1290 96997
1904:3 1 636. 31995 1331. 69995






































































































































































































































































































































































































8 . lOOOO8 30000 
8. 40000 8. 40000 
8 . OOOOO
7. 900008. 100008 400008. 50000
9. 20000
9 80000 










12 . 10000 
12. 20000 
12. 10000
A P P E N D IX  I I I
P L O T S OF A C T U A L , F IT T E D  V A LU E S 
AND R E S ID U A L S  OF THE R E G R E S S IO N S
METHOD OF E ST IM A T IO N  : 
IN STRUM EN TA L V A R IA B L E S
TH REE ST A G E L E A S T  SQ U A R ES 
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THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARES: SECTOR 1 

















-0. 7275651E—0 1 
-0. 3285117E-01 
0 .4964200E—01 







0. 1 440479E—01 
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THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARES: SECTOR 1 
ALL VARIABLES ARE IN LOGARITHMS
EMPLOYMENT EQUATION
DEPENDENT VARIABLE; L/K
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION 
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
STANDARD DEVIATION 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC (ADJ. FOR 0 GAPS)








SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION 
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
STANDARD DEVIATION 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 









SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION 
MEAN OF DEPENOENT VARIABLE 
STANDARD DEVIATION 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 









SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION 
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
STANDARD DEVIATION 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 








THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARES: SECTOR 2 
ALL VARIABLES ARE IN LOGARITHMS
PARAMETER N STANDARD
DEPENDENT VAR.: L ESTIMATE 'ERROR T-STATISTIC
CONST 0. 6149980 0. 2978995 2. 064448
L ( - l  ) 0.7493013 0.6741465E—01 11. 11481
CL/P(-4) - 0 .7318885E-01 0.2787816E-01 -2. 625311
REXP(—1) 0 .8771S72E—01 0.4328117E-01 2. 026718
K2 0. 7591835E—01 0 .3009467E—Oi 2. 522651
DEPENDENT VAR. : CL/P
CONST • 1.264994 0. 1022121 12. 37617
DU -0.1614045 0. 444726IE-01 -3. 629301
U<-1> -0. 6885550E—01 0. 1890450E-Ö1 -3. 642280
WEDGE 0. 5208022 0. 5069229E—01 10. 27379
AW 1 0. 2747152 0. 6380473E-01 4. 305561
TIME 0. 1171325E-01 0 . 1173140E-02 9.984533
TIME SQUARE ' -0. 1094415E-03 0. 1U9727E-04 -9.773949
DEPENDENT VAR. : P/CL
CONST -1.582303 0. 6585720 -2. 402627
P/CL(—1) 1. 033879 0 .3887241E-01 26. 59673
DDP 0.5499828 0. 5378459E-01 9. 859046
PM/CL(-4) 0 .4403330E—01 0 . 1319924E—01 3. 336048
REXP(-1)) 0. 1 ¿06441 0 .4383909E-01 2. 751977
DEPENDENT VAR. : I
CONST -1.356562 0. 4854527 -2. 794426
I (-1 ) 0.7502000 0 7411752E—01 10. 12176
CL/P(-3) -0. 3678752 0. 1150494 -3. 197542
D2REXP . 1. 312275 0. 3624490 3. 620577
K 0. 3602928 0 .9215269E-01 3. 909737
R ( — 1 ) -0.2589807 0. 1330643 -1. 946282
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